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We study the online learning model: a widely applicable model for making repeated
choices in an interactive environment. In standard online learning model (or an
online learning problem), the decision-maker is provided with a set of alternatives,
and selects one alternative in each of the T sequential trials, deriving a reward for
each selection. After T trials, the total reward of the decision-maker is compared
with the best “single-arm” strategy which has the maximum reward in hindsight.
The difference between the reward of the best single-arm strategy and that of the
algorithm is called the regret , and one seeks decision-making algorithms whose
regret is sublinear in T and running time is polynomial in the problem size.
In this thesis, we extend the basic online learning model in two important
ways. In the first extension, we model sponsored search auctions as a multi-armed
bandit problem (a type of online learning problem), and allow the alternatives (or
advertisers in this case) to be strategic which can report possibly wrong rewards (in
order to make personal gains). We seek to provide incentives to advertisers so as to
get good solutions (socially efficient solutions). We prove that any socially efficient
solution that provides right incentives to advertisers (being dominant strategy
truthful) must suffer much higher regret than the regret suffered by algorithms for
multi-armed problem without incentive issues.
In the second extension, also motivated by sponsored search and resource se-
lection in distributed systems, we allow the set of available alternatives to vary
over time, provide a natural way to define the regret, and give policies for the
decision-maker that suffer low regret. We also prove that the regret suffered by
our policies is information-theoretically the lowest possible.
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What should a decision maker do when faced with the problem of making a
sequence of choices? For example, how should a search engine allocate its adver-
tisement space to different competing advertisers? How should a doctor decide
which treatments to administer to patients in order to ensure good results? How
should a forecaster make predictions in order to be right most of the time? In
this thesis, we focus on a mathematical model that formalizes these and related
questions.
In learning theory literature, these types problems fall under the umbrella of
online learning. This online learning framework is used for modelling and reason-
ing about the uncertainty in the environment, and has been of immense practical
applicability in areas ranging from computer science and machine learning to statis-
tics. In the section below, we give an informal introduction to the online learning
framework, and then point to applications where this framework has been very
fruitful.
1.1 An informal introduction to online learning
Before formalizing the online learning framework, let us understand what it hopes
to capture. The basic idea behind online learning is that
1. the input to the problem is revealed over time to the algorithm, and
2. the algorithm (or the decision maker) makes choices in a sequence of time
rounds in order to optimize some measure of its performance.
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As is evident from the generality of the definition, this framework models a variety
of processes. In the stock market, the information about the price of a stock
becomes available over time, and the algorithmic trading agent tries to maximize
its net gain over a sequence of days. In a weather forecasting service, the “expert
advice” about the weather is revealed over time, and the decision maker tries to
make good prediction based on its current information. In a peer to peer system,
the information about network latencies is gathered by the algorithm over time,
and the algorithm must make decisions to download files from a set of available
hosts with this limited information. And the list continues.
To fix the terminology, we will call the process generating the input an adversary
(denoted adv). In many applications, it is hard to model this process, and we
assume either that the input is generated by some appropriate distribution, or in an
arbitrary (worst-case) way. We will denote the decision-maker (or the algorithm)
by alg. These are the two competing entities in the “game”. At a high level,
they interact for some number of rounds (generally denoted by T , which may or
may not be fixed) in sequence. In each round, there are some number of options
(or alternatives or arms) to choose from for the alg: the algorithm chooses one
of the alternatives, and the adversary chooses the reward for each alternative in
that round. At the end of the round, the adversary learns what alternative the
algorithm chose, and the algorithm learns some feedback about the rewards in
that round and how it did in that round (this feedback is specified by the feedback
model, that we will formally define in a later section), and also collects the reward
for its chosen alternative. The goal of the algorithm is to maximize the cumulative
reward collected over the time horizon.
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The attractiveness of the model comes from its simplicity and power. It is
simple and natural, and at the same time very powerful in that it can model a
variety of problems. Before we formalize the model and give precise definitions, we
will point out the breadth of applications that can be modelled using the generic
online learning framework described above.
1.1.1 Applications of online learning
Online learning has been very successful in modelling numerous application rang-
ing from design of clinical trials to gambling. Due to its modelling capabilities,
the framework has been a subject of intense study in theoretical computer sci-
ence, machine learning, and statistics. We next present a small sample of the
applications.
Design of clinical trials This is one of the original applications of the online
learning problem (Berry and Pearson, 1985). In the design of clinical trials,
the decision-maker is an experimenter (a doctor) who administers one of K
experimental treatments to a sequence of patients, without knowing which
treatment is the most effective. If the patient benefits from the treatment,
we associate it with large “reward” for the decision maker, and vice-versa.
The goal is to design a strategy for administering treatments so that the
cumulative treatment of all patients is effective. By thinking of K treatments
as the K options in the online learning problem, the problem is well-modelled
as an online learning problem.
Algorithms in networks Imagine a (decision-maker) host in a peer-to-peer
(P2P) network intending to download a sequence of files from other hosts in
the system. When a file is downloaded from a particular host, the decision-
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maker suffers a certain latency. How does the algorithm minimize the total
latency suffered by the sequence of all downloads? By identifying the hosts
with the arms, and negative latency as the rewards, this problem can be
modelled as an online learning problem.
Also note that there is nothing special about “downloading files” in the
above example. We can consider a host in a P2P network trying to “acquire
a resource” or “find some information” over a sequence of rounds, and trying
to maximize the overall quality. By associating a reward function with every
host in each time round (negative latency, bandwidth etc.), we can model
this general problem as an online learning problem. For instance, a DNS
lookup algorithm can be modelled in this framework by identifying the DNS
servers as arms, and negative latency of lookup time with the reward of a
particular DNS server.
Ranking in search engine How should a search engine order the search results
in order to give the most relevant results to the users? If we identify the
“ranking of results” with arms, and “user’s satisfaction with the ranking”
with the reward of the ranking, the problem of choosing a good ranking can
be modelled as an online learning problem (see (Radlinski et al., 2008)).
Online sponsored search auctions Which advertisements a search-engine
should put in the ad-slots in order to get the most number of clicks and
show ads with high value? Which ads should be put on webpages in order
to get large number of clicks (Madani and DeCoste, 2005)? These problems
can naturally be modelled as online learning problems by identifying ads with
arms and value per click of an ad (or probability of getting a click) as the
reward for choosing a particular arm.
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These applications are only a few from a large number of applications of the
online learning problems. Instead of surveying other such applications, we will
now focus on precisely defining the online learning problem, which is the subject
of this thesis.
1.2 Definition of online learning problems
Recall from the informal discussion above that in the online-learning framework,
there are two “entities” called the algorithm (alg) and the adversary (adv). They
interact for some number of indeterminate or fixed rounds, commonly denoted by
T . In the beginning of the interaction, some information is exchanged between
the algorithm and the adversary (depending on the particular problem). Then, in
each round in turn,
• firstly, the adversary specifies the set of alternatives K(t) ⊆ K the algorithm
can choose from;
• secondly, the (adv) selects some reward function r(t) : K(t) → [0, 1] from
a set Γ of all reward functions (this could be the set of all functions from
K(t) to [0, 1]) without revealing it to the alg and the algorithm (alg) selects
one of the alternatives i ∈ K(t) to play (without revealing it to the adv)
simultaneously, and
• thirdly, the adversary learns which alternative i ∈ K(t) was chosen, the
algorithm learns some feedback about the rewards (examples of which will
be given later), and the algorithm collects the reward ri(t) corresponding to
alternative chosen (see Figure 1.1).
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In the end, there is possibly some additional communication between the algorithm
and the adversary. Both algorithm and adversary could be randomized.
The exact meaning of what feedback the algorithm learns depends on the par-
ticular online learning problem. For example, in the design of clinical trials, the
doctor gets the feedback about how a particular treatment worked for a particular
patient and not necessarily about how other treatments might have worked for the
patient. For now, let us denoted the feedback model by F. This is a function that
takes reward function r and the chosen arm i as an argument, and returns the
“feedback”, F(r, i). The set of all feedbacks is denoted by range(F). The online
learning problem is specified by (K,Γ,F), where Γ is the set of all reward functions
chosen by the adversary.
In the next section, we give a formal definition of the online-learning problems,
and of two particular instantiations thereof: the best-expert problem and the multi-
armed bandit problem.
1.2.1 Arms, rewards, and feedbacks
An online learning problem specifies a set of alternatives [K] := {1, 2, . . . , K} which
are the possible alternative to choose from, and a set of rounds [T ] := {1, 2, . . . , T}.
The set of reward functions is denoted by Γ; each member of Γ is a function
r : [K] → [0, 1] (we allow rewards from a bounded set, but we normalize the
bounded set to [0, 1] for ease of exposition). The reward of arm i at time t is denoted
by ri(t), and the sum of rewards of arm i from time s to time t (i.e.,
∑t
u=s ri(u)) is
denoted by ri(s : t). The feedback received by the algorithm is determined by the
“feedback function” F, which is a function F : Γ × [K] → range(F). The online
problem is denoted by the tuple (K,Γ,F).
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1 Some communication happens between algorithms and adversary in the very
beginning.
2 FOR t = 1, 2, . . . , T (T may or may not be known in advance)
3 Adversary specifies the set of alternatives K(t).
4 Simultaneously, (i) algorithm picks one of the alternatives, say i(t), and
(ii) adversary chooses rewards for each of the alternatives, say
rj(t) ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ K(t).
5 Simultaneously, (i) the choice of algorithms revealed to the adversary,
and (ii) some feedback about the rewards is revealed to the
algorithm.
6 Algorithm collects reward for the alternative chosen, that is ri(t)(t).
7 Some additional communication happens between algorithm and adversary at
the very end.
Figure 1.1: Interaction between adversary and algorithm in an online-
learning problem.
We now discuss in detail the various ingredients of the model.
Alternatives or arms or options The set of alternatives is usually denoted by
integers 1 through K, but could be any set in general, for example, a set of
advertisements to choose from in an online sponsored search application.
Rewards We restrict the rewards of actions to be from [0, 1]. The rewards for
options can be modelled in various ways depending on the application in
discussion. We usually consider three such ways.
i.i.d. (or stochastic) rewards The reward of arm i is chosen according to
a probability distribution Pi over [0, 1]. That is, the reward of arm i
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in round t, ri(t), is a random sample from Pi (and similarly for other
arms).
In this case, the quality of an arm can be measured by the mean of
its reward distribution, that is, EX∼Pi [X]. Typically, Pi is a Bernoulli
distribution with support {0, 1} with a fixed mean µi.
oblivious rewards In this case, the reward for all K options during all
T rounds are decided in the beginning of the interaction, and cannot
be changed thereafter. In particular, the rewards cannot depend on
the algorithm’s choices and behaviour (but don’t have to be stochastic
either).
adaptive rewards In this case, the rewards in round t are decided after in-
teraction up to time t−1 has happened. The rewards could be arbitrary,
and could depend on the history of play.
This is the most general model and applies when it is hard to model the
quality of various options.
Types of feedback The feedback is a general function of reward function r and
the option i ∈ [K]. This is the information the algorithm gets after round t
about how it “performed” in that round. We consider two types of feedbacks:
(i) full-feedback model, and (ii) partial-feedback model. In the full-feedback
model, the algorithm is informed of the rewards of all alternatives in that
round, giving rise to a special instantiation of the online learning problem
called the best-expert problem. In the partial-feedback model, the algorithm
is told only about the reward of the alternative it chose, and not about the
rewards of alternatives it did not choose, giving rise to another important
instantiation of the online learning problem called the multi-armed bandit
problem. Let us discuss these two types of online learning problem.
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1. In the best-expert problem (online learning problem with full feedback),
the algorithm is given full information about the rewards in the previ-
ous time steps. In this case, if the adversary chooses reward function
r(t) ∈ Γ and the algorithm chooses alternative i(t) ∈ K(t), the feed-
back F(r(t), i(t)) given to the algorithm is r(t), which is a function
r(t) : K(t)→ [0, 1], i.e., the algorithm sees the rewards for all the pos-
sible choices it could have made. Note that the algorithm still collects
the reward ri(t).
A sample problem captured by this model, for instance, is that of aggre-
gating information from K weather forecast websites to generate a new
forecast. The algorithm collects a reward of 1 if its forecast is correct,
and 0 otherwise. The goal is to maximize the cumulative reward. This
problem falls in the full feedback model, because at the end of the day,
the algorithm can observe for all weather forecasts if their prediction
was correct or not.
2. In the multi-armed bandit problem (the online learning problem with
partial feedback), the algorithm is given only the information about the
reward of the alternative it chose (and not about the alternatives it
did not choose). If the adversary chooses reward function r(t) and the
algorithm chooses alternative i(t), the algorithm is given the feedback
F(r(t), i(t)) = ri(t)(t).
As an example, this feedback model captures the application like down-
loading a sequence of files in a P2P network, since it is in general not
possible for the algorithm to know how long it would have taken to
download a file from a different host than it chose.
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1.2.2 Algorithm and adversary
An algorithm is a probability space Φalg with sample space Ωalg (which is endowed
with standard Borel measure, say) and a sequence of functions alg(t) : Ωalg ×
(range(F))t−1 → K(t), for t = 1, 2, . . . , where K(t) ⊆ K is the set of available
strategies (as will be explained when we describe the adversary). We interpret this
as follows: if the random seed of the algorithm is ωalg ∈ Ωalg and it has gotten the
feedback f(1), f(2), . . . , f(t− 1) in previous t− 1 rounds, then it chooses the arm
(alg(t))(ωalg, f(1), f(2), . . . , f(t− 1)) to be played in round t.
An adversary similarly consists of a probability space Φadv with sample space
Ωadv (which is endowed with standard Borel measure) and a sequence of func-
tions adv+(t) : Ωadv × Kt−1 → 2[K] and adv(t) : Ωadv × Kt−1 → Γ, for
t = 1, 2, . . . , where Γ is the set of reward functions. We interpret this as
the following: when the adversary has the random seed ωadv and the algorithm
has chosen alternatives i(1), i(2), . . . , i(t − 1) in the past, the adversary chooses
(adv+(t))(ωadv, i(1), i(2), . . . , i(t−1)) as the set of available options/arms for round
t and endows it with reward function (adv(t))(ωadv, i(1), i(2), . . . , i(t− 1)).
Depending on how the adversary chooses the rewards, the adversary can be
i.i.d. (or stochastic), oblivious, or adaptive.
What this definition formalizes is the idea that the algorithm gets a sequence of
coin flips in form of ωalg (in case the algorithm is randomized), and in each round
it has access to feedback about the decisions it has made up to this time. Given
this information, it outputs a alternative to be chosen in the next time round.
Similarly, the adversary could be randomized and gets a sequence of coin flips in
form of ωadv. It gets to observe the alternatives chosen by the algorithm up to
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time t − 1 and chooses the set of available alternatives for round t and a reward
function that assigns reward to the chosen (available) alternatives.
1.2.3 Objective function: Regret
As we mentioned earlier, the goal of the algorithm is to maximize the reward
collected in the run of T rounds. We will measure the quality of the solution
produced by an algorithm in terms of what is known as regret. Let us define the
regret next.
First we define the T -step regret of an algorithm against a fixed adversary with
respect to a fixed strategy x. A strategy is just a rule for picking arms in a sequence
of rounds.







Here, the expectation is taken with respect to the probability space gener-
ated by the random variables that alg and adv generate (that is, the prob-
ability measure generated by random variables {alg(t)}Tt=1, {adv+(t)}Tt=1, and
{F(adv(t), alg(t))}Tt=1).
The strategy x to compare the regret against is usually the one of picking a
fixed arm in every time round, but we will consider other strategies too. The
strategy of always picking arm i will be denoted by single-armi. Note that we
abuse notation by using rx(t) to denote the reward of strategy x at time t, even
when x is not a fixed arm.
We next define the T -step regret of an algorithm alg against adversary adv
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with respect to a set of strategies X.
regret(alg, adv;X,T ) = sup
x∈X
{regret(alg, adv;x, T )} . (1.2.1)
In the above definition, X is typically taken to be ∪i∈K{single-armi}, in which
case the regret is against picking the single best arm (or against the single-best
arm benchmark). Similarly, the T -step regret of an algorithm against a family of
adversaries ADV with respect to a set of strategies can be defined as
regret(alg, ADV;X,T ) = sup
adv∈ADV
{regret(alg, adv;X,T )} .
We also define the strong regret as










Notice the difference between regret(alg, adv;X,T ) and r̂egret(alg, adv;X,T ).
In the former, it is the maximum of expectations; in latter, it is expectation of the
maximums. The (weak) regret and strong regret are also called ex-ante regret and
ex-post regret respectively. Using the fact that for random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn
defined over the same probability space, E[maxiXi] ≥ maxi E[Xi], it follows that
r̂egret(alg, ADV;X,T ) ≥ regret(alg, ADV;X,T ).
This finishes the definition of regret. Let us now turn our attention to discussing
why this is a good measure of quality of an algorithm.
Why is regret a good measure? When we measure the performance of an
algorithm in terms of its regret with respect to the set X = ∪i∈K{single-armi},
we are comparing the algorithm that is allowed to pick any allowable arm at any
time with a benchmark which is restricted in that it can pick only one fixed arm
in all rounds. Why is this a fair comparison and why is this a good measure?
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It is easy to see that if the algorithm were allowed to know the distributions
P1, P2, . . . , PK (in i.i.d. adversary case), then the best any algorithm could do
is to pick the alternative with the maximum expectation, i.e., alternative that
achieves the argmax in arg maxi EX∼Pi [X], at least in the case when the set of
allowable strategies is fixed to K. Now, if the algorithm is not allowed to know
the distributions, then the regret measure how much the algorithm loses by not
knowing the distributions. Or in other words, how much the algorithms should be
“willing” to pay to know the distributions.
Remarks about maximization versus minimization There are usually two
versions of online learning problems: the maximization version in which the goal
is to maximize the rewards, and the minimization version in which the goal is to
minimize the costs. In this thesis, we only consider the maximization version. To
get the results for the minimization version, we can take the reward to be negative
cost, and minimize the regret in the resulting maximization version.
Remarks about Baysian multi-armed bandits In this work, we don’t make
any assumptions about beliefs about the quality of different arms. In particular,
there are no priors on how profitable (or bad) the arms are. In this sense, the
problems we are considering are called Worst Case Online Problems.
There is a rich literature on the Bayesian version of the problem where the
algorithm gets as input a prior on the reward distribution of each arm, and then is
required to collect as much reward in expectation as possible (expectation is taken
with respect to the randomness used by the algorithm as well as the randomness
used in deciding the quality of the arms in the beginning). For this line of work
(which is not considered in thesis), see (Gittins, 1979; Gittins and Jones, 1979;
Gittins, 1989).
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1.3 Problems considered in this thesis
In this thesis, we consider generalizations of the best-expert problem and the multi-
armed bandit problem. The main thrust of our work is to analyze various gen-
eralizations of the basic online-learning framework (both the multi-armed bandit
problem and best-expert problem), which are motivated by applications which we
discuss next. Detailed discussion of related work appears in respective chapters.
We noticed earlier that the online learning framework models many applica-
tions, and is very widely applicable. Despite its applicability, there are certain
limitations of the basic model described above. For example, it is implicit in the
algorithms that the number of arms is small (this is not a hard restriction, but
otherwise the regret becomes very large, since the regret grows polynomially with
number of arms), all arms are always available to be picked (that is, K(t) is re-
stricted to be K in each round), their rewards can be observed accurately, the
decision maker is risk-neutral (which is why regret is defined in terms of expecta-
tion of rewards) and so on.
The focus of thesis is to notice that for some applications of the multi-armed
bandit (MAB) problem and the best-expert (BEX) problem these assumptions
don’t hold. Thus, we relax the assumptions in order to model the application
scenarios more faithfully. The applications we consider come from sponsored search
and computer networks. The two important scenarios that are considered are
(1) online sponsored search auctions, where the arms are strategic advertisers, and
the algorithm cannot observe the true rewards, and (2) many cases of interest in
computer systems where not all options are always available.
We describe these two applications in turn.
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1.3.1 Truthful MAB problem
As mentioned before, one important assumption in the MAB problem is that the
algorithm obtains (and can observe) the accurate reward for the chosen arm (that
is, the feedback is the actual reward of the chosen arm). Although this is often
the case, there are many important exceptions. Consider, for example, sponsored
search auctions, where a search engine needs to decide what advertisement (ad)
to show in an ad slot alongside the search results, in order to maximize the social
welfare. See Figure 1.3.1.
More concretely, the search engine (or the decision-maker) has the opportunity
to show a few ads besides each search query. Let us assume that there is space
for only one ad. Every time a shown ad is clicked (by a search-engine user),
the total value (or reward) derived by the collective “system” (search-engine and
advertisers) is a value specific to that ad (which is called the value per click for
that ad). Also, when an ad is shown, it is clicked with an ad-specific probability
called its click-through rate. Naturally, nobody knows the click-through rate of
an ad (until it is shown a few times and its click-through rate estimated) and the
value-per-click of an ad is private information for the owner of that ad. One goal
of the search engine is to show ads in a sequence of rounds in order to maximize
the overall value derived by the collective system (called the social welfare).
Notice that the task of maximizing the social welfare is made difficult by the
fact that when a specific ad is shown and clicked on, the search engine doesn’t
know precisely how much “reward” it got, since the reward derived from the click
is equal to the value-per-click of the ad which is a private information of the owner
of the ad.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of sponsored search. In response to the user query
(“sports shoes” in this case), the search engine shows a set of
search results as well as some advertisements (sponsored links)
on top (light blue background in this figure) and right side.
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When we model sponsored search auction as an MAB problem by identifying
ad i with arm i that yields expected reward civi (ci: click through rate, vi: value
per click), the arms have effectively become strategic agents, because vi is the value
that ad i derives when clicked on, which only ad i knows about and the algorithm
cannot directly observe it. If the search-engine asks the ads for their value-per-
click, they might have an incentive to either understate or overstate their value
per click. We therefore need to look into incentivizing the strategic ads to reveal
their true value-per-click. We focus on the solution/equilibrium where every ad
gets the most benefit by telling the true value per click to the search engine. How
do we design the algorithm such that truthtelling is indeed an equilibrium?
In Chapter 3, we consider the truthful multi-armed bandit problem: a strategic
version of the classical MAB problem which models the sponsored search auction
scenario described above. We model the auction as a mechanism design problem,
in which each agent (ad) i bids a value bi as a proxy for its true value per click vi
(bi may not be equal to vi). The allocation algorithm then allocates ads (to the
single ad slot) for T time rounds. At the end, it charges payments pi from ad i (or
from the owner of ad i), in return of showing its ad (called the pricing rule). The
pair (allocation algorithm, pricing rule) is called the mechanism. It is truthful if
each agent derives as much utility from bidding her true value as she can derive
from bidding any other value, where the utility of agent i is defined as the number
of clicks she got times her value per click minus the payment she paid. We aim
to find a truthful mechanism that minimizes the regret (defined as in the classical
MAB problem).
Can we find mechanisms that achieve regret for the truthful MAB problem that
is as low as can be obtained for the classical MAB problem? We investigate this
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question in detail in Chapter 3, and prove rigorously that the structure of truth-
ful mechanisms for truthful MAB problem is very restrictive; in particular, they
cannot simultaneously explore arms and exploit an empirically good arm. Here,
“exploration” means choosing arms according to some predetermined distribution,
independent of their perceived quality, and “exploitation” means choosing an arm
that has been good in the past. At a high level, we prove the following result.
Main Theorem 1.3.1. Let A be an allocation rule for truthful MAB problem
which satisfies some natural and technical conditions1. This allocation rule can be
made into a truthful mechanism by a pricing rule if and only if
1. A allocates an ad more often if the ad increases its bid, everything else re-
maining constant, and
2. If the allocation decision in a round depends on bids, then the feedback from
that round (in form of a click/no-click) is not used later in the algorithm.
Note that the first condition above is a form of monotonicity condition that is
common to many truthful mechanisms (Archer and Tardos, 2001; Myerson, 1981;
Nisan et al., 2007). The second condition, which can be viewed as separation
between exploration and exploitation (see Chapter 3 for precise definitions), is
novel to our analysis. It says that if the algorithm is exploiting a good arm in a
particular round (by letting allocation decision depend on the bids), then it cannot
simultaneously explore in the sense that the feedback from this round must not be
used later in making allocation decisions.
As a result of the above result, truthful mechanisms end up performing much
worse (sometimes exponentially worse) than the algorithms for the classical MAB
1See Theorem 3.2.3 for details.
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problem. More quantitatively, any truthful mechanism must suffer a regret of
Ω(K1/3T 2/3), while best algorithms for classical MAB problem are known to
achieve regret O˜(K1/2T 1/2), where K is the number of arms. This work also
suggests that a truthful mechanism sometimes must show ads without charging
anything, which is somewhat counterintuitive.
1.3.2 Sleeping MAB problem
Another implicit assumption in the MAB problem is the availability of arms in
every round. Consider the problem of picking a good node from which to download
a file in a peer-to-peer network (in general, the problem of using a resource in a
distributed system). We can model this as an MAB problem by identifying nodes
with arms. However, the assumption that arms are always available is clearly
violated. In a realistic setting, nodes can enter and leave constantly, or can be
down for maintenance, or certain parts of the network can be unreachable; thus
there is no guarantee that any node is always available. In Chapter 4, we consider
the sleeping bandit and expert problems where the set of actions that are available
to the decision algorithm varies over time, and arms are arbitrarily unavailable
in time rounds. With a few notable exceptions, such problems have been largely
unaddressed in the literature. Departing from previous work on this “Sleeping
Experts” problem, we compare algorithms against the payoff obtained by the best
ordering of the actions, which is a natural benchmark for this type of problem. As
no single arm is always available anymore, we suggest an extension of the “single-
best arm benchmark” (as defined in the definition of regret, (1.2.1)), called the
ordering benchmark , which orders the K arms according to the best possible order
(out of K! feasible orders), and always picks the first available arm in the chosen
order. The ordering benchmark enjoys the following nice properties: (a) it reduces
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to the usual single-best arm benchmark when all arms are available, (b) it is natural
since this is how people seem to pick one option from the set of available options,
and (c) it gives the optimal strategy when the algorithm knows the distribution of
arms’ rewards.
We study both the full-feedback (best expert) and partial-feedback (multi-
armed bandit) settings and consider both stochastic and adversarial reward models.
For all settings we give algorithms achieving (almost) information-theoretically
optimal regret bounds (up to a constant or a sub-logarithmic factor) with respect
to the best-ordering benchmark.
When the rewards for arms in each round are independent samples from arm-
dependent distributions (i.e., when the adversary is i.i.d.), we provide an efficient
algorithm which suffers a regret that is within a constant factor of what is achiev-
able, both in full-feedback and partial-feedback settings. The lower bound is a
particular novelty in this work, since it holds uniformly over time, rather than
only in the limit of time horizon approaching infinity (Lai and Robbins, 1985a).
The variant with adversarial rewards turns out to be more difficult. Although we
provide algorithms that achieve regret within constant factor of optimal in the
full-feedback setting and within sub-logarithmic factor of optimal in the partial-
feedback setting, both algorithms have exponential running time. To appreciate
the hardness of the fully adversarial case, we prove that, unless RP = NP, any low
regret algorithm that learns internally a consistent ordering (see Theorem 4.3.3)
over experts cannot be computationally efficient. Learning a consistent ordering
just means that the algorithm chooses an arm by first choosing an ordering and
then choosing the first available arm in the chosen ordering. Note that this does
not mean that there can be no computationally efficient, low regret algorithms
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for the fully adversarial case. There might exist learning algorithms that are able
to achieve low regret without actually learning a consistent ordering over experts.
Finding such algorithms, if they do indeed exist, remains an open problem.
1.4 Bibliographic notes
The material in Chapter 3 is joint work with Moshe Babaioff and Alex Slivkins,
which appeared in (Babaioff et al., 2009). The material in Chapter 4 is joint work




ALGORITHMS FROM LEARNING THEORY
In this chapter, we review some algorithms for online learning problems that
will be used later in this thesis. We consider the following four problems:
1. Best expert problem with adversarial rewards: The algorithms for this prob-
lem are some of the first to appear for online learning problems (Littlestone
and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1997). We will use the presented
algorithm in Section 4.3.1 to derive algorithm for sleeping version of the best
expert problem.
2. Linear optimization problem with full-feedback: We haven’t discussed this
problem before. In this problems, the set of options/arms is continuous, let
us say a subset of Rk (instead of discrete K arms), and the reward functions
is restricted to be linear. We present this problem because the best expert
problem can be reduced to linear optimization, and algorithms for linear
optimization problems are easier to generalize to other setting we consider
later in this thesis (see Section 4.2.1).
3. Stochastic multi-armed bandit problem: In this version of the multi-armed
bandit problem, rewards are generated according to a predetermined distri-
bution, and the algorithm learns the value of the random rewards for the
arms it chooses. This algorithm will be generalized to the sleeping version of
stochastic multi-armed bandit problem in Section 4.2.2.
4. Adversarial multi-armed bandit problem: In this version of the multi-armed
bandit problem, there are no assumptions on the process generating the
rewards. We also consider a slight variant of the problem (as detailed in
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Section 2.4) from Auer et al. (2002a), which will be used in Chapter 4 (see
Section 4.3.2).
Now, we turn out attention to the Hedge algorithm for the adversarial best-expert
problem.
2.1 The Hedge algorithm
Let us recall the main ingredients of the adversarial best-expert setting from pre-
vious chapter.
• Options: K options/experts.
• Rewards: adversarial rewards with range [0, 1].
• Feedback: full-feedback model.
The goal of the algorithm, as usual, is to maximize its reward. In this section, we
present the Hedge algorithm (Freund and Schapire, 1997) which achieves a regret
of O(√T logK) for this setting.
An informal description The algorithm starts at round t = 1, with weight
vector wi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ K. In the beginning of a typical round t, the algorithm
has wi(t−1) for all i ∈ [K]. It selects one of the alternatives (each with probability
proportional to the current weight of the alternative), observes rewards for all
alternatives, and update all wi(t − 1) to wi(t) for all i ∈ [K] (according to an
exponential update rule). The algorithm is presented in Figure 2.1.
The algorithm is randomized, and the adversary could be randomized too. The
sigma-field generated by all the information algorithm has observed by time t is
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1 PARAMETER:  > 0.
2 wi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ [K].
3 t = 1.
4 WHILE t ≤ T
5 w(t− 1) = ∑i∈[K] wi(t− 1).
6 pi(t) = wi(t− 1)/w(t− 1).
7 Select expert i with probability pi(t), that is alg(t) = i with probability
pi(t).
8 // observe rewards ri(t) for all i ∈ [K].
9 update wi(t) = wi(t− 1)(1 + )ri(t).
10 t = t+ 1
Figure 2.1: The Hedge algorithm. The update rule wi(t) = wi(t− 1) · eγ·ri(t)
can be analyzed in a somewhat different way, but essentially gives
the same regret bound.
denoted by F (t). Similarly, the adversary observes alg(t), the expert chosen by
algorithm in time t. The sigma-field generated by all the information observed
by the adversary by time t is called G(t). The sigma-field generated by all the
information observed by both the algorithm and the adversary by time t (that is
the union of F (t) and G(t)) is denoted by FG(t).
F and this
Analysis of algorithm In this section, we analyse the Hedge algorithm pre-
sented in Figure 2.1. The regret bound for the algorithm is presented in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.1.1. The regret of the Hedge algorithm can be bounded by




Here, and elsewhere, we will use rmax(·) to stand for maxi ri(·). So, the regret
is with respect to the best arm in hindsight.
We will also use V[·] to denote the value of a random variable.
Proof. Note that the random variable V[wi(t) | F (t)] is a constant function, and
so is V[wi(t) | FG(t)].
We will analyze how the weights grow as a function of time.
V[wi(t+ 1) | FG(t)] = wi(t)(1 + )V[ri(t+1)|FG(t)], for i ∈ [K].
Now, sum over all i to get








wi(t)(1 + V[ri(t+ 1) | FG(t)])
= w(t) + 
∑
i
wi(t)V[ri(t+ 1) | FG(t)].
Divide both sides by w(t) to get
V[w(t+ 1) | FG(t)]
w(t)
≤ 1 + 
∑
i
V[pi(t+ 1) | FG(t)]V[ri(t+ 1) | FG(t)]
= 1 + 
∑
i
V[pi(t+ 1)ri(t+ 1) | FG(t)] (because pi(t+ 1) is
constant given FG(t).)
Taking expectation on both sides,
E[w(t+ 1) | FG(t)]
w(t)
≤ 1 + E[ralg(t+ 1) | FG(t)].
Note that before taking the expectation, the random variables were measurable
with respect to FG(t+1), and the expectation is taken so as to make the resulting
expectation measurable with respect to FG(t).
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Take the log of both sides to get:
logE[w(t+ 1) | FG(t)]− logw(t) ≤ E[ralg(t+ 1) | FG(t)].
Since E[log(X)] ≤ logE[X] we get
E[logw(t+ 1)− logw(t) | FG(t)] ≤ E[ralg(t+ 1) | FG(t)].
Taking one more expectation yields the unconditional inequality.
E[logw(t+ 1)− logw(t)] ≤ E[ralg(t+ 1)].
This inequality holds for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. Summing for all these values of t
yields:
E[logw(T )− logw(0)] ≤ E[ralg(1 : T )].
Note that w(0) = K. Rearranging the terms we get





Let us now put a lower bound on E[logw(T )]. We have V[w(T ) | FG(T )] ≥
V[wi(T ) | FG(T )] = V[(1 + )ri(1:T ) | FG(T )] for all i ∈ [K]. Taking the log
shows that V[logw(T ) | FG(T )] ≥ V[ri(1 : T ) log(1 + ) | FG(T )] for all i.
Taking one more expectation yields the unconditional inequality E[logw(T )] ≥





≥ 1− , and rearranging the terms, we get
E[ri(1 : T )]− E[ralg(1 : T )] ≥ E[ri(1 : T )] + logK

, for all i.
Taking i as an expert in arg maxj E[rj(1 : t)] gives the result in the theorem.
We can put an upper bound T on E[ri(1 : T )] for all i. Taking  =
√
(logK)/T
gives a regret bound of O(√T logK).
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2.2 Follow the leader algorithm
Follow the Leader algorithm (Hannan, 1957; Kalai and Vempala, 2005) is an al-
gorithm for linear optimization, and not just for the expert problems we are con-
sidering, but it can be used to solve best-expert problem. Let us first outline the
linear optimization problem, and then present the algorithm.
The linear optimization problem In the linear optimization problem, the set
of strategies S is a compact set in Rd on which a linear function can be optimized.
(To model the best-expert problem with K experts as a linear optimization prob-
lem, we take S to be convex hull of K unit vectors e1, e2, . . . , eK .) The set of
reward function Γ is the set of linear functions. Note that the reward functions
can be identified with vectors in Rd. For a reward function r ∈ Rd, and strategy
x ∈ S, the reward rx is r · x, where (·) denotes the inner product of vectors. The
rewards are oblivious. The feedback model is the full-feedback model, which means
that the algorithm observes the vector r at the end of the round. Here is a quick
summary:
• Set of options: A compact set S ⊆ Rd.
• Rewards: Linear functions over S. Oblivious to the choices of algorithm.
• Feedback model: full-feedback.
The “follow the leader” algorithm from Hannan (1957); Kalai and Vempala
(2005) is shown in Figure 2.2.
Analysis of the algorithm Let us set up some notation that would be useful
in the analysis of the algorithm. We denote by r(i : j) the vector
∑j
t=i r(t), and by
OPT(r) the vector arg maxx∈S r·x. Therefore, according to our notation, rOPT(s)(t)
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1 PARAMETER:
2 : length of the initial vector r0 (see below).
3 Choose a random vector r0 from [−1 , 1 ]d.
4 FOR t = 1, 2, . . . , T
5 Choose the strategy arg maxx∈S
(∑t−1
s=0 rs · x
)
Figure 2.2: Follow the leader algorithm.
denotes r(t) ·OPT(s), that is the reward of strategy k := OPT(s) (that is optimal
for reward function s) when the actual reward function is r(t).
In the discussion below, p-norm (for p ≥ 1) of a vector x ∈ Rd is ‖x‖p :=(∑d
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
, and p-norm of a set S is ‖S‖p := supx,y∈S ‖x−y‖p. As a notational
convenience, we denote limp→∞ ‖x‖p by ‖x‖∞. Taking the limit p→∞, ‖x‖∞ :=
maxi=1,2,...,d |xi − yi|, and ‖S‖∞ = supx,y∈S ‖x− y‖∞.















From this theorem, we can derive a regret bound for the best-expert problem









In the best expert problem, S is the simplex in K dimensions ({x ∈ RK : ‖x‖1 =
1}), whose L1 diameter is a constant. Since all rewards are bounded between 0
and 1, the vector of rewards r(t) has L1 norm at most K. Using  = K
−1T−1/2, the
“follow the leader” algorithm gives a regret bound of O(
√
TK2), which is slightly
worse than the O(√T logK) bound of Hedge algorithm.
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The idea of the analysis of the algorithm is to proceed in two parts.
1. Show that playing the “best cumulative strategy” for every time round (that
is, OPT(r(0 : t)) in round t) is at least as good as playing any other fixed
strategy (if we can play it).
2. Show that playing the “best cumulative strategy for past” for every time
round (that is, OPT(r(0 : t− 1)) in round t) is not much worse compared to
the “best cumulative strategy” in the previous bullet point.
In the next two lemmas, we prove these results.
Lemma 2.2.2. For every time t, and for every x ∈ S,







Proof. This can be proved easily by induction. For t = 0, the statement is true
from the definition of OPT(r(0)). Let us assume that the statement holds for t−1.



















rx(s) for any x ∈ S. (From the definition of
OPT(r(0 : t)).)
This proves the lemma.
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Once we know that playing OPT(r(0 : t)) at time t is as good as playing any
other fixed strategy, why don’t we just play it? The problem is that we don’t know
r(t) before playing in round t. So, we now show that playing OPT(r(0 : t− 1)) is
not much worse.
Lemma 2.2.3. For any t, we have
E[rOPT(r(0:t−1))(t)] ≥ E[rOPT(r(0:t))(t)]− 
2
‖r(t)‖21‖S‖∞,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the algorithm and that of
the (oblivious) adversary.
Proof. Let us define p := r(0 : t − 1) and q := r(0 : t), hence q = p + r(t). (Note
that both of these are random variables because r(0) is random.) We will produce
a random variable q˜ such that its distribution is the same as that of q, but it is
coupled with p, such that P[p 6= q˜] ≤ 
2
‖r(t)‖1. Let us define
r˜(0) :=







Now we define q˜ = r˜(0) + r(1 : t). See Figure 2.2 for an illustration. Note that
r˜(0) has the same distribution as r(0), and hence q˜ has the same distribution as
q. Also, the probability that q˜ is not equal to p is equal to the volume of hatched
regions in Figure 2.2, which can be bounded by
















With this probability, when p and q˜ are different, the difference in
rOPT(r(0:t−1))(t) and rOPT(r(0:t))(t) can be at most
max
x,y∈S
|rx(t)− ry(t)| = max
x,y




Range of q and of q˜










Figure 2.3: Illustration of coupling in Follow-The-Leader algorithm. The
range of the random variable p (that is r(1 : t−1) added with ran-




]d) is denoted by the solid square,
and those of q and q˜ are denoted by the dashed square. After
coupling of p and q˜, if p lies in the intersection of solid and dashed
box, then so does q˜ (and they are equal). If p lies in the hatched
region of the solid box (say it is equal to point labelled (i)), then
q˜ lies in the hatched region of the dashed box (and it is equal






Therefore, the difference in E[rOPT(r(0:t−1))(t)] and E[rOPT(r(0:t))(t)] can be at most

2
‖r(t)‖1‖r(t)‖1‖S‖∞, proving the lemma.
Now, we are ready to prove the performance guarantee of the algorithm.
















Let us focus on the first term on the right hand side. The strategy x is a “free


















































finishing the proof of the theorem.
Note that we assume in the analysis that the adversary is oblivious (not adap-
tive).
2.3 UCB1 algorithm
In this section, we provide the UCB1 algorithm (Auer et al., 2002a) for the multi-
armed bandit problem with i.i.d. adversary. Recall that there are K arms; let
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µi denote the mean of arm i for i = 1, 2, . . . , K. Here are the ingredients of the
problem:
• Arms: K arms, numbered 1 through K.
• Rewards: Stochastic rewards for arm i that are drawn independently from
distribution Pi with (fixed but unknown) mean µi.
• Feedback: partial-feedback model.
The idea of algorithm is to keep an observed mean for each arm, and also
a confidence interval around each arm indicating how confident the algorithm is
that the actual mean is within the confidence interval of the observed mean. Then
the algorithm plays the most optimistic arm, assuming the actual mean of the
arm might be at the highest point in the confidence interval. The algorithm is
presented in Figure 2.4.
Analysis of UCB1 The following theorem bounds the regret of the UCB1 algo-
rithm. Let arms be indexed by decreasing order of means, that is µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥
µK . We denote by ∆i the difference between the mean of best arm and that of
arm i, that is ∆i := maxj µj − µi, which is equal to µ1 − µi if arms are ordered in
decreasing means order.
Theorem 2.3.1. The regret of UCB1 against an i.i.d. adversary can be bound by
T · (max
i






Proof. Let us set up some notation first that will be useful in the analysis. We
denote the value of variable v at time by v(t). So, ni(t), for example, denotes the
number of times arm i has been played up to time t.
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1 VARIABLE:
2 t: current time round.
3 ni: number of times arm i is played
4 Ri: total reward of arm i.
5 ci: confidence interval for arm i
6 t = 1
7 WHILE t ≤ K
8 play arm t at time t, and observe reward rt
9 nt = 1
10 Rt = rt
11 t = t+ 1
12 WHILE true











14 // break ties arbitrarily.
15 play arm j := x(t), and observe reward rx(t)(t) at time t.
16 nj = nj + 1
17 Rj = Rj + rj(t)
18 t = t+ 1
Figure 2.4: UCB1 algorithm for stochastic multi-armed bandit.
Let us denote by µˆi(t) the observed mean for arm i by time t, that is Ri(t)/ni(t),
and by ρi(t) the confidence interval
√
8 log(t)/ni(t).
We first state some concentration bounds on the values of µˆi(t). Using Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality (Azuma, 1967; Hoeffding, 1963), we have the following (the
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quality follows just from the definitions of µˆi(t) and ρi(t))
P
[




µˆi(t) 6∈ [µi − ρi(t), µi + ρi(t)]
]
≤ 2t−4. (2.3.1)
Let us consider a sequence of T trials, and call a run of T rounds clean if event
in (2.3.1) does not happen for any arm and any round. That is, a run of T trials
is called clean if µˆi(t) ∈ [µi − ρi(t), µi + ρi(t)] for all i ∈ [K] and for all t ∈ [T ]. A
run is clean with high probability, as can be seen from the following calculation:














In the case when the run is not clean, the algorithm can suffer a regret of as much as
T , so the total regret due non-clean runs can be at most O(KT−2) in expectation.
We will now focus our attention on clean runs.
Let us order the arms in the decreasing order of their average rewards µi. So,
µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . Let us define ∆i := µ1 − µi. The expected regret of the
algorithm can be bounded by
∑K
i=2 E[ni(T )]∆i. We will focus our attention on one
particular term of this sum.
Let us bound E[ni(T )] for a fixed i. Define Qi(T ) = 32 log(T )/∆2i . Note that
after playing arm i for Qi(T ) times, the confidence interval of arm i (ρi(t)) is at
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P[ni(T ) ≥ t] +
T∑
t=Qi(T )+1
P[ni(T ) ≥ t]
≤ Qi(T ) +
T∑
t=Qi(T )+1
P[ni(T ) ≥ t]





P[(ni(u− 1) = t− 1) ∧ (x(u) = i)]
(The equality holds because the event [ni(T ) ≥ t]
is equal to the event that the arm was played for
t-th time in some round (called round u above).)







(ni(u− 1) = t− 1)
∧ (µˆi(u− 1) + ρi(u− 1) ≥ µˆ1(u− 1) + ρ1(u− 1))
]












8(log(u− 1))/ni(u− 1) ≥ µ1
)]












8(log(T ))/(t− 1) ≥ µ1
)]







µi + ∆i/2 +
√
8(log(T ))/Qi(T ) ≥ µ1
]
(Since µˆi(u− 1) ≤ µi + ρi(u− 1) for clean runs.)







µi + ∆i/2 + ∆i/2 ≥ µ1
]
= Qi(T ). (Since all the probabilities
are zero.)
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Therefore, the total regret of the algorithm can be bounded by the sum of regret
from non-clean runs, and regret from playing suboptimal arms in the clean runs.















This proves the performance guarantee of the UCB1 algorithm.
2.4 The Exp3 and Exp4 algorithms
In this section, we present algorithms for the non-stochastic version of multi-armed
bandit problem (Auer et al., 2002a).
In the non-stochastic version of the problem, the rewards are not sampled using
a distribution, but can be chosen arbitrarily by an adversary. The feedback model
is the partial-feedback model. In summary, we have
• Arms: K arms numbered 1 through K.
• Rewards: Arbitrary rewards, bounded in [0, 1].
• Feedback: partial-feedback model.
The Exp3 algorithm (presented in Figure 2.5) achieves sublinear regret for the
non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problem (adaptive adversary).
We now state and prove the performance guarantee of Exp3.
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1 PARAMETER:
2 γ ∈ (0, 1).
3 VARIABLE:
4 wi(t) for i ∈ [K] and t = 1, 2, . . .
5 Set wi(1) = 1 for all i.
6 t = 1.




9 pi(t) = (1− γ)wi(t)w(t) + γK .
10 Choose the action i with probability pi(t), and set it equal to i(t), and
observe its reward ri(t)(t).
11 rˆi(t) =

ri(t)/pi(t) if i = i(t)
0 otherwise.
12 wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) · e γK rˆi(t).
13 t = t+ 1.
Figure 2.5: Exp3 algorithm for non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problem.
Theorem 2.4.1. Against any adaptive adversary, the regret of Exp3 can be bounded
by
E[rmax(1 : T )]− E[rExp3(1 : T )] ≤ O(
√
TK lnK).
En route to proving the above theorem, we will prove the following performance
guarantee, from which the theorem follows immediately by taking γ =
√
K lnK/T .
Lemma 2.4.2. For any adaptive adversary, the regret of Exp3 can be bounded by




Proof. Let F (t) be the σ-field generated by random choices of algorithm up to
time t, and G(t) be the σ-field generated by random choices of adversary up to
time t. Also, let FG(t) be the σ-field generated by F (t) and G(t).
We first analyze the evolution of weights w(t+ 1).






















































rˆi(t) (because pi(t)rˆi(t) is at
most ri(t).)
Taking logarithms on both sides and using the inequality 1 + x ≤ ex, we get
V[ln(w(t+ 1))− ln(w(t)) | FG(t)] ≤ γ/K






Taking the expectation with respect to randomness in round t and using linearity
of expectations to get
E[ln(w(t+ 1))− ln(w(t)) | FG(t)]
≤ γ/K














E[ri(t) | FG(t)] (because
E[rˆi(t)] =
E[ri(t)].)
Taking another expectation over FG(t) and summing over all t gives














1− γE[rExp3(1 : T )] +
(e− 2)(γ/K)2
1− γ KE[rmax(1 : T )]. (2.4.1)
Also note that
E[lnw(T + 1)] ≥ E[ln(wi0(T + 1))] (for every i0.)









(Conditioned on FG(T + 1),











In particular, putting i0 equal to the best action, we get











E[rmax(1 : T )].
Using these relations in (2.4.1), we get
γ
K
E[rmax(1 : T )]− lnK ≤ γ/K
1− γE[rExp3(1 : T )] +
(e− 2)(γ/K)2
1− γ KE[rmax(1 : T )].
Rearranging the terms, we get
E[rmax(1 : T )]− E[rExp3(1 : T )] ≤ γ(e− 1)E[rmax(1 : T )] + (1− γ)K lnK
γ
.
We get the statement of the lemma by noting that γ > 0.
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2.4.1 Regret against best strategy from a pool
We now consider a slightly different problem, in which there are N “experts” which
give “advice” to the algorithm about what to play in each round (the multi-armed
bandit problem corresponds to K experts each of which “recommend” playing the
corresponding arm in each time round). The goal of the algorithm is to minimize
the regret with respect to the best expert in hindsight. The ingredients of the
problem are:
• N experts (options) each of which chooses one of K arms in each rounds. N
is typically much larger than K.
• Rewards: [0, 1]-bounded rewards for each arm in each time round.
• Feedback: partial-feedback model.
Let us formalize the problem now. There are N experts, each of which (indexed
by superscript i) gives a probability distribution ξi(t) = (ξi1(t), . . . , ξ
i
K(t)) over the











− E[ralg(1 : T )],
and the goal is to minimize it.
Assumption: The uniform-expert (which has ξj(t) = 1/K for all t and j) is
included in the set of experts.
In Figure 2.6, we present the algorithm Exp4 for this problem, which works like
Exp3. Note that throughout this section, (N) experts are indexed by superscripts,
and (K) arms are indexed by subscripts.
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1 PARAMETER:
2 γ ∈ (0, 1).
3 VARIABLE:
4 wi(t) for i ∈ [N ] and t = 1, 2, . . .
5 Set wi(1) = 1 for all i.
6 t = 1.





9 Get the expert advices ξ1(t), . . . , ξN(t).








11 Choose the action j with probability pj(t), and set it equal to j(t), and
observe its reward rj(t)(t).
12 rˆj(t) =








14 wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) · e γK yˆi(t).
15 t = t+ 1.
Figure 2.6: Exp4 algorithm for non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problem.
Lemma 2.4.3. Against an adaptive adversary and a set of N experts, the regret
of Exp4 can be bound by
E[rmax(1 : T )]− E[rExp4(1 : T )] ≤ (e− 1)γE[rmax(1 : T )] + K lnN
γ
,
where the max is taken over all N experts.
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Taking logarithms on both side (and making use of the inequality 1 + x ≤ ex), we
get
















































where j(t) denotes the arm chosen in round t.



























1− γ . (because pj(t)(t)rˆj(t)(t) =
rj(t)(t) ≤ 1.)
So, (2.4.2) simplifies to









Take expectations (twice) on both side and sum over t = 1, 2, . . . , T to get

























To simplify the left hand side of (2.4.3), note that for any i0 ∈ [N ], we have (where
yi(t) is defined as the reward of expert i in round t)







































The first term on the right hand side of (2.4.3) can be bounded by
T∑
t=1












= K · E[yuniform expert(1 : T )]
≤ K · E[ymax(1 : T )]. (because, the uniform
expert is in the set of
experts.)
Equation 2.4.3 hence simplifies to
γ
K
E[ymax(1 : T )]− lnN ≤ γ/K






K · E[ymax(1:T )].
Rearranging the terms, we get
E[ymax(1 : T )]− E[rExp4(1 : T )] ≤ (e− 1)γE[ymax(1 : T )] + (1− γ)K lnN
γ
.
This proves the statement of the lemma.
It is worth noting here that the performance guarantee of Exp4 algorithm also
holds against adaptive adversaries.
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CHAPTER 3
TRUTHFUL MULTI-ARMED BANDIT PROBLEM
In this chapter, we consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-
per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an
advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser
derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Initially,
neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood
of clicks on the advertisements. The auctioneer’s goal is to design a (dominant
strategy) truthful mechanism (one in which each advertiser prefer to tell the truth
about her private information, see Section 3.4) that (approximately) maximizes
the social welfare.
If the advertisers bid their true private values, our problem is equivalent to
the multi-armed bandit problem, and thus can be viewed as a strategic version
of the latter. In particular, for both problems the quality of an algorithm can be
characterized by regret, the difference in social welfare between the algorithm and
the benchmark which always selects the same “best” advertisement. We investi-
gate how the design of multi-armed bandit algorithms is affected by the restriction
that the resulting mechanism must be truthful. We find that truthful mecha-
nisms have certain strong structural properties – essentially, they must separate
exploration from exploitation – and they incur much higher regret than the opti-
mal multi-armed bandit algorithms. Moreover, we provide a truthful mechanism
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which (essentially) matches our lower bound on regret.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been much interest in understanding the implication of
strategic behavior on the performance of algorithms whose input is distributed
among selfish agents. This study was mainly motivated by the Internet, the main
arena of large scale interaction of agents with conflicting goals. The field of Algo-
rithmic Mechanism Design (Nisan and Ronen, 2001) studies the design of mecha-
nisms in computational settings (for background see the recent book Nisan et al.
(2007) and survey Roughgarden (2008)).
Much attention has been drawn to the market for sponsored search (e.g. Lahaie
et al. (2007); Edelman et al. (2007); Varian (2007); Mehta et al. (2007); Aggarwal
and Muthukrishnan (2008)), a billion dollar market with numerous auctions run-
ning every second. Research on sponsored search mostly focus on equilibria of the
Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction (Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2007), the
auction that is most commonly used in practice (e.g. by Google and Yahoo), or
on the design of truthful auctions (Aggarwal et al., 2006). All these auctions rely
on knowing the rates at which users click on the different advertisements (a.k.a.
Click-Through-Rates, or CTRs), and do not consider the process in which these
CTRs are learned or refined over time by observing users’ behavior. We argue that
strategic agents would take this process into account, as it influences their utility.
Prior work (Immorlica et al., 2005) focused on the implication of click fraud on
the methods used to learn CTRs. We, on the other hand, are interested in the
implications of the strategic bidding by the agents. Thus, we consider the problem
of designing truthful sponsored search auctions when the process of learning the
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CTRs is a part of the game.
We are mainly interested in the interplay between the online learning and the
strategic aspects of the problem. To isolate this issue, we consider the following
setting, which is a natural strategic version of the multi-armed bandit (MAB)
problem introduced in Chapter 1. In this setting, there are k agents (we use small
k to denote the number of agents in this chapter, as opposed to capital K which
was used earlier in Chapter 1). Each agent i has a single advertisement, and a
private value vi > 0 for every click she gets. The mechanism is an online algorithm
that first solicits bids from the agents, and then runs for T rounds. In each round
the mechanism picks an agent (using the bids and the clicks observed in the past
rounds), displays her advertisement, and receives a feedback – if there was a click
or not. Payments are assigned after round T . Each agent tries to maximize her
own utility: the difference between the value that she derives from clicks and the
payment she pays. We assume that initially no information is known about the
likelihood of each agent to be clicked, and in particular there are no Bayesian
priors.
We are interested in designing mechanisms which are truthful (in dominant
strategies): every agent maximizes her utility by bidding truthfully, for any bids
of the others and for any clicks that would have been received. The goal is to
maximize the social welfare.1 Since the payments cancel out, this is equivalent to
maximizing the total value derived from clicks, where an agent’s contribution to
that total is her private value times the number of clicks she receives. We call this
setting the MAB mechanism design problem.
1Social welfare includes both the auctioneer’s revenue and the agents’ utility. Since in practice
different sponsored search platforms compete against one another, taking into account the agents’
utility increases the platform’s attractiveness to the advertisers.
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In the absence of strategic behavior this problem reduces to a standard MAB
formulation in which an algorithm repeatedly chooses one of the k alternatives
(“arms”) and observes the associated payoff: the value-per-click of the correspond-
ing ad if the ad is clicked, and 0 otherwise. The crucial aspect in MAB problems is
the tradeoff between acquiring more information (exploration) and using the cur-
rent information to choose a good agent (exploitation). MAB problems have been
studied intensively for the past three decades (see (Berry and Fristedt, 1985; Cesa-
Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006; Gittins, 1989)). In particular, the above formulation is
well-understood (Auer et al., 2002b,b; Dani and Hayes, 2006) in terms of regret
relative to the benchmark which always chooses the same “best” alternative. This
notion of regret naturally extends to the strategic setting outlined above, the total
payoff being exactly equal to the social welfare, and the regret being exactly the
loss in social welfare. Thus one can directly compare MAB algorithms and MAB
mechanisms in terms of welfare loss (regret).
Broadly, we ask how the design of MAB algorithms is affected by the restriction
of truthfulness: what is the difference between the best algorithms and the best
truthful mechanisms? We are interested both in terms of the structural properties
and the gap in performance (in terms of regret). We are not aware of any prior
work that characterizes truthful learning algorithms or proves negative results on
their performance.
3.2 Our contributions
We present two main contributions.
• First, we present a characterization of (dominant-strategy) truthful mecha-
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nisms.
• Second, we present a lower bound on the regret that such mechanisms must
suffer. This regret is significantly larger than the regret of the best MAB
algorithms.
Formally, a mechanism for the MAB mechanism design problem is a pair (A,P),
where A is the allocation rule (essentially, an MAB algorithm), and P is the
payment rule. Note that regret is completely determined by the allocation rule.
As is standard in the literature, we focus on mechanisms in which each agent’s
payment (averaged over clicks) is between 0 and her bid; such mechanisms are
called normalized, and they satisfy voluntary participation (agents don’t have any
incentives not to participate).
The setting we study is a single-parameter auction, the most studied and well-
understood type of auctions. For such settings truthful mechanisms are fully char-
acterized (Myerson, 1981; Archer and Tardos, 2001): a mechanism is truthful if
and only if the allocation rule is monotone (by increasing her bid an agent cannot
cause a decrease in the number of clicks she gets), and the payment rule is defined
in a specific and (essentially) unique way. Yet, this characterization is not the right
characterization for the MAB setting! The main problem is that in our setting click
information for any agent that is not chosen at a given round is not available to the
mechanism, and thus cannot be used in the computation of payments. Thus, the
payment cannot depend on any unobserved clicks. We show that this has severe
implications on the structure of truthful mechanisms.
The first notable property of a truthful mechanism is a much stronger version
of monotonicity:
Definition 3.2.1. A realization consists of click information for all agents at all
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rounds (including unobserved ones). An allocation rule is pointwise monotone if
for each realization, each bid profile and each round, if an agent is played/shown at
the round, then she is also played/shown after increasing her bid (fixing everything
else).
Let us consider (for the ease of exposition) allocation rules that satisfy the fol-
lowing two natural conditions. First, an allocation rule is scale-free if it is invariant
under multiplying all bids by the same positive number (essentially, changing the
currency unit). Second, it is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA, for short)
if for any given realization, bid profile and round, a change of bid of agent i cannot
transfer the allocation in this round from agent j to agent l, where these are three
distinct agents.
We show that any truthful mechanism must have a strict separation between
exploration and exploitation. A crucial feature of exploration is the ability to
influence the allocation in forthcoming rounds. To make this point more concrete,
we call a round influential for a given realization if for some bid profile changing
the realization for this round can affect the allocation in some future round. We
show that in any such round, the allocation can not depend on the bids. Thus,
influential rounds are essentially useless for exploitation.
Definition 3.2.2. An allocation rule A is called exploration-separated if for any
given realization, the allocation in any influential round for that realization does
not depend on the bids.
We are now ready to present our main structural result, which is in fact a
complete characterization.
Theorem 3.2.3. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a non-
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degenerate2 deterministic allocation rule which is scale-free and satisfies IIA. Then
mechanism (A,P) is normalized and truthful for some payment rule P if and only
if A is pointwise monotone and exploration-separated.
We also obtain a similar (but somewhat more complicated) characterization
without assuming that allocations are scale-free and satisfy IIA (Theorem 3.5.8).
We use it then to derive Theorem 3.2.3. We emphasize that our characterization
results hold regardless of whether the auctioneer’s goal is to maximize welfare or
revenue or any other objective.
In view of Theorem 3.2.3, we present a lower bound on the performance of
exploration-separated algorithms. We consider a setting, termed the stochastic
MAB mechanism design problem, in which each click on a given advertisement is
an independent random event which happens with a fixed probability, a.k.a. the
CTR. The expected “payoff” from choosing a given agent is her private value times
her CTR. For the ease of exposition, assume that the bids lie in the interval [0, 1].
Then the non-strategic version is the stochastic MAB problem in which the payoff
from choosing a given arm i is an independent sample in [0, 1] with a fixed mean
µi. In both versions, regret is defined with respect to a hypothetical allocation rule
(resp. algorithm) that always chooses an arm with the maximal expected payoff.
Specifically, regret is the expected difference between the social welfare (resp. total
payoff) of the benchmark and that of the allocation rule (resp. algorithm). The
goal is to minimize R(T ), worst-case regret over all problem instances on T rounds.
2Non-degeneracy is a mild technical assumption, formally defined in Section 3.4, which en-
sures that (essentially) if a given allocation happens for some bid profile (bi, b−i) then the same
allocation happens for all bid profiles (x, b−i), where x ranges over some non-degenerate inter-
val. Without this assumption, all structural results hold (essentially) almost surely w.r.t the
k-dimensional Lebesgue measure on the bid vectors. Exposition becomes significantly more cum-
bersome, yet leads to the same lower bounds on regret. For clarity, we assume non-degeneracy
throughout this version of the paper.
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We show that the worst-case regret of any exploration-separated mechanism
is larger than that of the optimal MAB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002b): Ω(T 2/3)
vs O(
√
T ) for a fixed number of agents. We obtain an even more pronounced
difference if we restrict our attention to the δ-gap problem instances: instances
for which the best agent is better than the second-best by a (comparatively large)
amount δ, that is µ1v1 − µ2v2 = δ · (maxi vi), where arms are arranged such
that µ1v1 ≥ µ2v2 ≥ · · · ≥ µkvk. Such instances are known to be easy for the
MAB algorithms. Namely, an algorithm can achieve the optimal worst-case regret
O(
√
kT log T ) and regret O(k
δ
log T ) on δ-gap instances (Lai and Robbins, 1985a;
Auer et al., 2002b). However, for exploration-separated mechanisms the worst-
case regret Rδ(T ) over the δ-gap instances is polynomial in T as long as worst-case
regret is even remotely non-trivial (i.e., sublinear). Thus, for the δ-gap instances
the gap between algorithms and truthful mechanisms in the worst-case regret is
exponential in T .
Theorem 3.2.4. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with
k agents. Let A be a deterministic allocation rule that is exploration-separated.
Then A has worst-case regret R(T ) = Ω(k1/3 T 2/3). Moreover, if R(T ) = O(T γ)
for some γ < 1 then for every fixed δ ≤ 1
4
and λ < 2(1 − γ) the worst-case regret
over the δ-gap instances is Rδ(T ) = Ω(δ T
λ).
We note that our lower bounds holds for a more general setting in which the
values-per-click can change over time, and the advertisers are allowed to change
their bids at every time step.
To complete the picture, we present a very simple (deterministic) mechanism
that is truthful and normalized, and matches the lower bound R(T ) = Ω(k1/3 T 2/3)
up to logarithmic factors.
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We also provide a number of extensions. First, we prove a similar (but slightly
weaker) regret bound without the scale-free assumption. Second, we extend some of
our results to randomized mechanisms; in this setting, (dominant-strategy) truth-
fulness means “truthfulness for each realization of the private randomness”. Third,
we consider a weaker notion of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms – for each
realization of the clicks, but in expectation over the random seed, and use this no-
tion to provide algorithmic results for the version of the MAB mechanism design
problem in which clicks are chosen by an adversary. Fourth, we discuss an even
more permissive notion of truthfulness – truthfulness in expectation over the clicks
(and the random seed).
3.3 Other related work and discussion
The question of how the performance of a truthful mechanism compares to that of
the optimal algorithm for the corresponding non-strategic problem has been con-
sidered in the literature in a number of other auction settings. Performance gaps
have been shown for various scheduling problems (Archer and Tardos, 2001; Nisan
and Ronen, 2001; Dobzinski and Sundararajan, 2008) and for online auction for ex-
piring goods (Lavi and Nisan, 2005). Other papers presented approximation gaps
due to computational constraints, e.g. for combinatorial auctions (Lavi et al., 2003;
Dobzinski and Sundararajan, 2008) and combinatorial public projects (Papadim-
itriou et al., 2008), showing a gap via a structural result for truthful mechanisms.
The study of MAB mechanisms has been initiated by Gonen and Pavlov (Gonen
and Pavlov, 2007). The authors present a MAB mechanism which is claimed to be
truthful in a certain approximate sense. Unfortunately, this mechanism does not
satisfy the claimed properties; this was also confirmed with the authors through
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personal communication (see also a similar note in (Devanur and Kakade, 2009)).
MAB algorithms were used in the design of Cost-Per-Action sponsored search
auctions in Nazerzadeh et al. (2008), where the authors construct a mechanism with
approximate properties of truthfulness and individual rationality. Approximately
truthful mechanisms are reasonable assuming the agents would not lie unless it
leads to significant gains. However, this solution concept is weaker than the exact
notion and it may still be rational for the agents to deviate (perhaps significantly)
from being truthful. Moreover, as truthful bidding is not a Nash equilibrium,
agents might have an increased incentive to deviate if they speculate that others are
deviating. All of that may result in unpredictable, and possibly highly suboptimal
outcomes. In this work we focus on understanding what can be achieved with the
exact truthfulness, mainly proving results of structural and lower-bounding nature.
We note in passing that providing similar results for the approximately truthful
setting such as the one in Nazerzadeh et al. (2008) is a worthy and challenging
open question.
Independently and concurrently, Devanur and Kakade (2009) have studied
truthful MAB mechanisms with focus on maximizing the revenue. They present a
lower bound of Ω(T 2/3) on the loss in revenue with respect to the VCG (Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves) payment, as well as a truthful mechanism that matches the lower
bound. (This mechanism is almost identical to the one that we present in order to
match the lower bound in Theorem 3.6.1.)
Our lower bounds use (a novel application of) the relative entropy technique
from (Lai and Robbins, 1985a; Auer et al., 2002b), see (Kleinberg, 2007b) for an
account. For other application of this technique, see e.g. (Dani and Hayes, 2006;
Karp and Kleinberg, 2007a; Kleinberg et al., 2008; Ben-Or and Hassidim, 2008).
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Our work focuses on regret in a prior-free setting in which the algorithm has
no prior on CTRs. This is in contrast to the recent line of work on dynamic
auctions (Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2006; Athey and Segal, 2007) which considers
fully Bayesian settings in which there is a known prior on CTRs, and VCG-like
social welfare-maximizing mechanisms are feasible. In our prior-free setting VCG-
mechanisms cannot be applied as such mechanisms require the allocation to exactly
maximize the expected social welfare, which is impossible (and not well-defined)
without a prior.
We require the mechanisms to satisfy a strong notion of truthfulness: bidding
truthful is optimal for every possible realization (and bids of others). This notion is
attractive as it does not require the agents to be risk neutral. Moreover, it allows
for the CTRs to change over time (and still incentivizes agents to be truthful).
Finally, an agent never regrets in retrospect that she has been truthful. It is
desirable to understand this notion before moving to weaker notions.
Map of the chapter. Section 3.4 is preliminaries. Truthfulness characterization
is developed and proved in Section 3.5. The lower bounds on regret is in Section 3.6
and a simple mechanism that matches them is in Section 3.7. Various extensions
are discussed in Section 3.8.
3.4 Definitions and preliminaries
In the MAB mechanism design problem, there is a set K of k agents numbered
from 1 to k. Each agent i has a value vi > 0 for every click she gets; this value is
known only to agent i. Initially, each agent i submits a bid bi > 0, possibly different
56
from vi.
3 The “game” lasts for T rounds, where T is the given time horizon. A
realization represents the click information for all agents and all rounds. Formally,
it is a tuple ρ = (ρ1 , . . . , ρk) such that for every agent i and round t, the bit
ρi(t) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether i gets a click if played at round t. An instance
of the MAB mechanism design problem consists of the number of agents k, time
horizon T , a vector of private values v = (v1, . . . , vk), a vector of bids (bid profile)
b = (b1, . . . , bk), and realization ρ.
A mechanism is a pair (A,P), where A is allocation rule and P is the payment
rule. An allocation rule is represented by a function A that maps bid profile b,
realization ρ and a round t to the agent i that is chosen (receives an impression) in
this round: A(b; ρ; t) = i. We also denote Ai(b; ρ; t) = 1{A(b;ρ;t)=i}. The allocation
is online in the sense that at each round it can only depend on clicks observed
prior to that round. Moreover, it does not know the realization in advance; in
every round it only observes the realization for the agent that is shown in that
round. A payment rule is a tuple P = (P1 , . . . ,Pk), where Pi(b; ρ) ∈ R denotes
the payment charged to agent i when the bids are b and the realization is ρ.4
Again, the payment can only depends on observed clicks. A mechanism is called
normalized if for any agent i, bids b and realization ρ it holds that Pi(b; ρ) is
non-negative and at most bi times the number of clicks agent i got.
For given realization ρ and bid profile b, the number of clicks received by agent
i is denoted Ci(b; ρ). Call C = (C1 , . . . , Ck) the click-allocation for A. The utility
3One can also consider a more realistic and general model in which the value-per-click of an
agent changes over time and the agents are allowed to change their bid at every round. The case
that the value-per-click of each agent does not change over time is a special case. In that case
truthfulness implies that each agent basically submits one bid as in our model (the same bid
at every round), thus our main results (necessary conditions for truthfulness and regret lower
bounds) also hold for the more general model.
4We allow the mechanism to determine the payments at the end of the T rounds, and not after
every round. This makes that task of designing a truthful mechanism easier and thus strengthen
our necessary condition for truthfulness (the condition used to derive the lower bounds on regret.)
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that agent i with value vi gets from the mechanism (A,P) when the bids are b and
the realization is ρ is Ui(vi; b; ρ) = vi · Ci(b; ρ)−Pi(b; ρ) (called quasi-linear utility).
The mechanism is truthful if for any agent i, value vi, bid profile b and realization
ρ it is the case that Ui(vi; vi, b−i; ρ) ≥ Ui(vi; bi, b−i; ρ).
In the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem, an adversary specifies a
vector µ = (µ1 , . . . , µk) of CTRs (concealed from A), then for each agent i and
round t, realization ρi(t) is chosen independently with mean µi. Thus, an instance
of the problem includes µ rather than a fixed realization. For a given problem
instance I, let i∗ ∈ argmaxi µi vi, then regret on this instance is defined as




i=1 µi vi Ai(b; ρ; t)
]
. (3.4.1)
For a given parameter vmax, the worst-case regret
5 R(T ; vmax) denotes the supre-
mum of RI(T ) over all problem instances I in which all private values are at
most vmax. Similarly, we define Rδ(T ; vmax), the worst-case δ-regret, by taking the
supremum only on instances with δ-gap.
Most of our results are stated for non-degenerate allocation rules, defined as
follows. An interval is called non-degenerate if it has positive length. Fix bid
profile b, realization ρ, and rounds t and t′ with t ≤ t′. Let i = A(b; ρ; t) and
ρ′ be the allocation obtained from ρ by flipping the bit ρi(t). An allocation rule
A is non-degenerate w.r.t. (b, ρ, t, t′) if there exists a non-degenerate interval I
containing bi such that
Ai(b′i, b−i;ϕ; s) = Ai(b;ϕ; s) for each ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′}, each s ∈ {t, t′}, and all b′i ∈ I.
In essence, non-degeneracy requires that there is a small enough interval containing
bi such that the allocation for agent i is same in all rounds irrespective of i’s bid
5By abuse of notation, when clear from the context, the “worst-case regret” is sometimes
simply called “regret”.
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as long as it is in the interval. An allocation rule is non-degenerate if it is non-
degenerate w.r.t. each tuple (b, ρ, t, t′).
3.5 Truthfulness characterization
Before presenting our characterization we begin by describing some related back-
ground. The click allocation C is non-decreasing if for each agent i, increasing her
bid (and keeping everything else fixed) does not decrease Ci. Prior work has es-
tablished a characterization of truthful mechanisms for single-parameter domains
(domains in which the private information of each agent is one-dimensional), relat-
ing click allocation monotonicity and truthfulness (see below). For our problem,
this result is a characterization of MAB algorithms that are truthful for a given
realization ρ, assuming that the entire realization ρ can be used to compute pay-
ments (when computing payments one can use click information for every round
and every agent, even if the agent was not shown at that round.) One of our main
contributions is a characterization of MAB allocation rules that can be truthfully
implemented when payment computation is restricted to only use clicks informa-
tion of the actual impressions assigned by the allocation rule.
An MAB allocation rule A is truthful with unrestricted payment computation
if it is truthful with a payment rule that can use the entire realization ρ in it
computation. We next present the prior result characterizing truthful mechanisms
with unrestricted payment computation.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Myerson (1981), Archer and Tardos (2001)). Let (A,P) be a
normalized mechanism for the MAB mechanism design problem. It is truthful with
unrestricted payment computation if and only if for any given realization ρ the
59
corresponding click-allocation C is non-decreasing and the payment rule is given by
Pi(bi, b−i; ρ) = bi · Ci(bi, b−i; ρ)−
∫ bi
0
Ci(x, b−i; ρ) dx. (3.5.1)
We can now move to characterize truthful MAB mechanisms when the pay-
ment computation is restricted. The following notation will be useful: for a given
realization ρ, let ρ ⊕ 1(i, t), be the realization that coincides with ρ everywhere,
except that the bit ρi(t) is flipped.
The first notable property of truthful mechanisms is a stronger version of mono-
tonicity. Recall (see Definition 3.2.1) that an allocation rule A is pointwise mono-
tone if for each realization ρ, bid profile b, round t and agent i, if Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t) = 1
then Ai(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = 1 for any b+i > bi. In words, increasing a bid cannot cause
a loss of an impression.
Lemma 3.5.2. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let (A,P) be
a normalized truthful mechanism such that A is a non-degenerate deterministic
allocation rule. Then A is pointwise-monotone.
Proof. For a contradiction, assume not. Then there is a realization ρ, a bid profile b,
a round t and agent i such that agent i loses an impression in round t by increasing
her bid from bi to some larger value b
+
i . In other words, we have Ai(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) <
Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t). Without loss of generality, let us assume that there are no clicks
after round t, that is ρj(t
′) = 0 for any agent j and any round t′ > t (since changes
in ρ after round t does not affect anything before round t).
Let ρ′ = ρ⊕ 1(i, t). The allocation in round t cannot depend on this bit, so it
must be the same for both realizations. Now, for each realization ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′} the
mechanism must be able to compute the price for agent i when bids are (b+i , b−i).
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That involves computing the integral Ii(ϕ) =
∫
x≤b+i Ci(x, b−i;ϕ) dx from (3.5.1).
We claim that Ii(ρ) 6= Ii(ρ′). However, the mechanism cannot distinguish between
ρ and ρ′ since they only differ in bit (i, t) and agent i does not get an impression
in round t. This is a contradiction.
It remains to prove the claim. Without loss of generality, assume that ρi(t) = 0
(otherwise interchange the role of ρ and ρ′). We first note that Ci(x, b−i; ρ) ≤
Ci(x, b−i; ρ′) for every x. This is because everything is same in ρ and ρ′ until round
t (so the impressions are same too), there are no clicks after round t, and in round
t the behavior of A on the two realizations can be different only if that agent i
gets an impression, in which case she is clicked under ρ′ and not clicked under ρ.
Since A is non-degenerate, there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing
bi such that changing bid of agent i to any value in this interval does not change the
allocation at round t (both for ρ and for ρ′). For any x ∈ I we have Ci(x, b−i; ρ) <
Ci(x, b−i; ρ′), where the difference is due to the click in round t. It follows that
Ii(ρ) < Ii(ρ
′). Claim proved. Hence, the mechanism cannot be implemented
truthfully.
Recall (see Definition 3.2.2) that round t is influential for a given realization
ρ if for some bid profile b there exists a round t′ > t such that A(b; ρ; t′) 6=
A(b; ρ ⊕ 1(j, t); t′) for j = A(b; ρ; t). In words: changing the relevant part of the
realization at round t affects the allocation in some future round t′. An allocation
rule A is called exploration-separated if for any given realization ρ and round t
that is influential for ρ, it holds that A(b; ρ; t) = A(b′; ρ; t) for any two bid vectors
b, b′ (allocation at t does not depend on the bids).
The main structural implication is “truthful implies exploration-separated”.
61
To illustrate the ideas behind this implication, we first state and prove it for two
agents.
Proposition 3.5.3. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem with two
agents. Let A be a non-degenerate scale-free deterministic allocation rule. If (A,P)
is a normalized truthful mechanism for some P, then it is exploration separated.
Proof. Assume A is not exploration-separated. Then there is a counterexample
(ρ, t): a realization ρ and a round t such that round t is influential and allocation
in round t depends on bids. We want to prove that this leads to a contradiction.
Let us pick a counterexample (ρ, t) with some useful properties. Since round t
is influential, there exists a realization ρ and bid profile b such that the allocation
at some round t′ > t (the influenced round) is different under realization ρ and
another realization ρ′ = ρ⊕1(j, t), where j = A(b; ρ; t) is the agent chosen at round
t under ρ. Without loss of generality, let us pick a counterexample with minimum
value of t′ over all choices of (b, ρ, t). For ease of exposition, from this point on let
us assume that j = 2. For the counterexample we can also assume that ρ1(t
′) = 1,
and that there are no clicks after round t′, that is ρl(t′′) = ρ′l(t
′′) = 0 for all t′′ > t′
and for all l ∈ {1, 2}.
We know that the allocation in round t depends on bids. This means that
agent 1 gets an impression in round t for some bid profile bˆ = (bˆ1, bˆ2) under
realization ρ, that is A(bˆ; ρ; t) = 1. As the mechanism is scale-free this means
that, denoting b+1 = bˆ1 b2/bˆ2 we have A(b+1 , b2; ρ; t) = 1. Since A(b1, b2; ρ; t) = 2
and A(b+1 , b2; ρ; t) = 1, pointwise monotonicity (Lemma 3.5.2) implies that b+1 > b1.
We conclude that there exists a bid b+1 > b1 for agent 1 such that A(b+1 , b2; ρ; t) = 1.
Now, the mechanism needs to compute prices for agent 1 for bids (b+1 , b2)
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under realizations ρ and ρ′, that is P1(b+1 , b2; ρ) and P1(b+i , b2; ρ′). Therefore, the
mechanism needs to compute the integral I1(ϕ) =
∫
x≤b+1 C1(x, b2;ϕ) dx for both
realizations ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′}.
First of all, for all x ≤ b+1 and for all t′′ < t′, A(x, b2; ρ; t′′) = A(x, b2; ρ′; t′′),
since otherwise the minimality of t′ will be violated. The only difference in the
allocation can occur in round t′.
Let us assume A1(b1, b2; ρ; t′) < A1(b1, b2; ρ′, t′) (otherwise, we can swap ρ and
ρ′). We make the claim that for all bids x ≤ b+1 of agent 1, the influence of round
t on round t′ is in the same “direction”:
A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) ≤ A1(x, b2; ρ′; t′) for all x ≤ b+1 . (3.5.2)
Suppose (3.5.2) does not hold. Then there is an x < b+1 such that 1 =
A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) > A1(x, b2; ρ′; t′) = 0. (Note that we have used the fact that the
mechanism is deterministic.) If x < b1 then pointwise monotonicity is violated
under realization ρ, since A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) > A1(b1, b2; ρ; t′); otherwise it is violated
under realization ρ′, giving a contradiction in both cases. The claim (3.5.2) follows.
Since A is non-degenerate, there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing bi
such that if agent 1 bids any value x ∈ I then A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) < A1(x, b2; ρ′; t′). Now
by (3.5.2) it follows that I1(ρ) < I2(ρ
′). However, the mechanism cannot distin-
guish between ρ and ρ′ when the bid of agent 1 is b+1 , since the differing bit ρ2(t) is
not observed. Therefore the mechanism cannot compute prices, contradiction.
3.5.1 General Truthfulness Characterization
Let us develop the general truthfulness characterization that does not assume that
an allocation is scale-free and IIA. We will later use it to derive Theorem 3.2.3.
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Definition 3.5.4. Fix realization ρ and bid vector b. A round t is called (b; ρ)-
secured from agent i if A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = A(bi, b−i; ρ; t) for any b+i > bi. A round t
is called bid-independent w.r.t. ρ if the allocation A(b; ρ; t) is a constant function
of b.
The following definitions elaborate on the notion of an influential round.
Definition 3.5.5. A round t is called (b; ρ)-influential, for bid profile b and realiza-
tion ρ, if for some round t′ > t it holds that A(b; ρ; t′) 6= A(b; ρ′; t′) for realization
ρ′ = ρ ⊕ 1(j, t) such that j = A(b; ρ; t).6 In this case, t′ is called the influenced
round and j is called the influencing agent of round t. The agent i is called an
influenced agent of round t if i ∈ {A(b; ρ; t′), A(b; ρ′; t′)}.
Note that a round is influential w.r.t. realization ρ if and only if it is (b, ρ)-
influential for some b. The central property in our characterization is that each
(b, ρ)-influential round is (b, ρ)-secured.
Definition 3.5.6. A deterministic allocation is called weakly separated if for every
realization ρ and each bid vector b, it holds that if round t is (b; ρ)-influential with
influenced agent i then it is (b; ρ)-secured from i.
We notice that exploration-separated is a stronger notion.
Observation 3.5.7. For a deterministic allocation, exploration-separated implies
weakly separated.7
6Note that realizations ρ and ρ′ are interchangeable.
7To see this, simply use the definitions. Fix realization ρ and bid vector b, let t be a (b; ρ)-
influential round with influenced agent i. We need to show that t is (b; ρ)-secured from i. Round
t is (b; ρ)-influential, thus influential w.r.t. ρ, thus (since the allocation is exploration-separated)
it is bid-independent w.r.t. ρ, thus agent i cannot change allocation in round t by increasing her
bid.
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We are now ready to state our general characterization.
Theorem 3.5.8. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a non-
degenerate deterministic allocation rule. Then mechanism (A,P) is normalized
and truthful for some payment rule P if and only if A is pointwise monotone and
weakly separated.
Proof. For the “only if” direction, A is pointwise-monotone by Lemma 3.5.2, and
the fact that A is weakly separated (for k agents) is proved next in Lemma 3.5.9
similarly to Proposition 3.5.3 (albeit with a few extra details).
Lemma 3.5.9. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let (A,P) be
a normalized truthful mechanism such that A is a non-degenerate deterministic
allocation rule. Then A is weakly separated.
Proof. Assume A is not weakly separated. Then there is a counterexample
(ρ, b, t, t′, i): a realization ρ, bid vector b, rounds t, t′ and agent i such that round
t is (b; ρ)-influential with influenced agent i and influenced round t′ and it does
not holds that round t is (b; ρ)-secured from i. We prove that this leads to a
contradiction..
Let us pick a counterexample (ρ, b, t, t′, i) with a minimum value of t′ over all
choices of (ρ, b, t, i). Without loss of generality, let us assume that ρi(t
′) = 1 and
ρj(t
′′) = 0 for all t′′ > t′ and for all agents j.
Let j = A(b; ρ; t). As it does not holds that round t is (b; ρ)-secured from i,
this means that j 6= i, and there exists a bid b+i > bi such that A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) 6= j.
Let ρ′ = ρ⊕ 1(j, t). The mechanism needs to compute prices for agent i when
her bid is b+i under realizations ρ and ρ
′, that is to compute Pi(b+i , b−i; ρ) and
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Pi(b+i , b−i; ρ′). Therefore, the mechanism needs to compute the integral Ii(ϕ) =∫
x≤b+1 Ci(x, b−i;ϕ) dx for both realizations ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ
′}.
First of all, for all x ≤ b+i and for all t′′ < t′, Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′′) = Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′′).
If not,then the minimality of t′ will be violated. This is because, if there were such
an x and t′′ < t′ with Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′′) 6= Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′′), then round t will still be
(b, ρ)-influential with influenced agent i, and influenced round t′′ < t′, violating
the minimality of t′′. Therefore, when we decrease the bid of agent i, the only
difference in the allocation can occur at time round t′.
As i is the influenced agent at round t′ it must hold that Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t′) 6=
Ai(bi, b−i; ρ′, t′). Let us assume 0 = Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t′) < Ai(bi, b−i; ρ′, t′) = 1 (oth-
erwise, we can swap ρ and ρ′). Note that we have made use of the fact that the
mechanism is deterministic. Let us make the the claim that for all bids x ≤ b+i the
influence of round t on round t′ is in the same “direction.”
Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) ≤ Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) for all x ≤ b+i . (3.5.3)
Suppose (3.5.3) does not hold. Then there is an x ≤ b+i such that 1 =
Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) > Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) = 0. (Note that we have used the fact that
the mechanism is deterministic.) If x > bi, then pointwise monotonicity is violated
in ρ′, since 0 = Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) < Ai(bi, b−i; ρ′; t′) = 1. If x < bi on the other
hand, then the pointwise-monotonicity is violated in ρ, since 1 = Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) >
Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t′) = 0, giving a contradiction in both cases. The claim (3.5.3) follows.
By the non-degeneracy of A, there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing
bi such that
Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) < Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) for all x ∈ I. (3.5.4)
By (3.5.3) and (3.5.4) it follows that Ii(ρ) < Ii(ρ
′). However, the mechanism
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cannot distinguish between ρ and ρ′ when agent i’s bid is b+i , since the differing
bit ρj(t) is not seen. Contradiction.
We now continue the proof of Theorem 3.5.8 and focus on its “if” direction (⇐
direction). Let A be a deterministic allocation rule which is pointwise monotone
and weakly separated. We need to provide a payment rule P such that the resulting
mechanism (A,P) is truthful and normalized. Since A is pointwise monotone,
it immediately follows that it is monotone (i.e., as an agent increases her bid,
the number of clicks that she gets cannot decrease). Therefore it follows from
Theorem 3.5.1 that mechanism (A,P) is truthful and normalized if and only if
P is given by (3.5.1). We need to show that P can be computed using only the
knowledge of the clicks (bits from the realization) that were revealed during the
execution of A.
Assume we want to compute the payment for agent i in bid profile (bi, b−i)
and realization ρ. We will prove that we can compute Ci(x) := Ci(x, b−i; ρ) for all
x ≤ bi. To compute Ci(x), we show that it is possible to simulate the execution of
the mechanism with bidi = x. In some rounds, the agent i loses an impression,
and in others it retains the impression (pointwise monotonicity ensures that agent
i cannot gain an impression when decreasing her bid). In rounds that it loses an
impression, the mechanism does not observe the bits of ρ in those rounds, so we
prove that those bits are irrelevant while computing Ci(x). In other words, while
running with bidi = x, if mechanism needs to observe the bit that was not revealed
when running with bidi = bi, we arbitrarily put that bit equal to 1 and simulate
the execution of A. We want to prove that this computes Ci(x) correctly.
Let t1 < t2 < · · · < tn be the rounds in which agent i did not get an impression
while bidding x, but did get an impression while bidding bi. Let ρ
0 := ρ, and let
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us define realization ρl inductively for every l ∈ [n] by setting ρl := ρl−1⊕1(jl, tl),
where jl = A(x, b−i; ρl−1; tl) is the agent that got the impression at round tl with
realization ρl−1 and bids (x, b−i).
First, we claim that jl 6= i for any l. Indeed, suppose not, and pick the smallest
l such that jl+1 = i. Then tl is a (x, b−i; ρl)-influential round, with influenced
agent jl+1 = i. Thus tl is (x, b−i; ρl)-secured from i. Since A(x, b−i; ρl; tl) =
A(x, b−i; ρl−1; tl) = jl 6= i by minimality of l, agent i does not get an impression in
round tl if she raises her bid to bi. That is, A(b; ρl; tl) 6= i. However, the changes
in realizations ρ0 , . . . , ρl−1 only concern the rounds in which agent i is chosen, so
they are not seen by the allocation if the bid profile is b (to prove this formally,
use induction). Thus, A(b; ρl; tl) = A(b; ρ; tl) = i, contradiction. Claim proved. It
follows that A(b; ρ; tl) = i for each l. (This is because by induction, the change
from ρl−1 to ρl is not seen by the allocation if the bid profile is b.)
We claim that Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) = Ai(x, b−i; ρn; t′) for every round t′, which
will prove the theorem. If not, then there exists l such that Ai(x, b−i; ρl; t′) 6=
Ai(x, b−i; ρl−1; t′) for some t′ (and of course t′ > tl). Round tl is thus (x, b−i; ρl)-
influential with influenced round t′ and influenced agent i. Moreover, the influenc-
ing agent of that round is jl, and we already proved that jl 6= i. Since round tl is
(x, b−i; ρl)-secured from agent i due to the “weakly separated” condition, it follows
that agent i does not get an impression in round tl if she raises her bid to bi. That
is, A(b; ρl; tl) 6= i, contradiction.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 3.5.8.
Note that we have proven the main characterization (Theorem 3.2.3) for the
case of two agents, because for two agents IIA trivially holds and in the scale-free
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case, an allocation is exploration-separated if and only if it is weakly separated.
Necessity of non-degenerate assumption Let us argue that the non-
degeneracy assumption in Theorem 3.5.8 is indeed necessary. To this end, let
us present a simple deterministic mechanism (A,P) for two agents that is truthful
and normalized, such that the allocation rule A is pointwise monotone, scale-free
and yet not weakly separated. (The catch is, of course, that it is degenerate.)
There are only two rounds. Agent 1 allocated at round 1 if and only if b1 ≥ b2.
Agent 1 allocated at round 2 if b1 > b2 or if b1 = b2 and ρ1(1) = 1; otherwise
agent 2 is shown. This completes the description of the allocation rule. To obtain
a payment rule P which makes the mechanism normalized and truthful, consider
an alternate allocation rule A′ which in each round selects agent 1 if and only if
b1 ≥ b2. (Note that A′ = A except when b1 = b2.) Use Theorem 3.5.8 for A′ to ob-
tain a normalized truthful mechanism (A′,P ′), and set P = P ′. The payment rule
P is well-defined since the observed clicks for P and P ′ coincide unless b1 = b2, in
which case both payment rules charge 0 to both players. The resulting mechanism
(A,P) is normalized and truthful because the integral in (3.5.1) remains the same
even if we change the value at a single point. It is easy to see that the allocation
rule A has all the claimed properties; it fails to be non-degenerate because round
t is influential only when b1 = b2.
3.5.2 Scalefree and IIA allocation rules
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.2.3, we show that under the right assumptions,
an allocation is exploration-separated if and only if it is weakly separated.
Lemma 3.5.10. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a non-
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Figure 3.1: This figure explains all the steps in the proof of Lemma 3.5.10.
The rows correspond to agents (whose identity is shown on the
right side), and columns correspond to time rounds. The aster-
isks show the impressions. The arrows show how the impressions
get transferred, and labels on the arrows show what causes the
transfer. In labels, “in ρ, bi ↑” denotes that a particular transfer
of impression is caused in realization ρ when bid bi in increased.
satisfies IIA. Then it is exploration-separated if and only if it is weakly separated.
Before presenting the full proof of the lemma, we present the proof sketch with
gives the main ideas.
Proof sketch of Theorem 3.5.10. We sketch the proof of Lemma 3.5.10 at a very
high level. The “only if” direction (⇒ direction) was observed in Observation 3.5.7.
For the “if” direction, let A be a weakly-separated mechanism. We prove by a
contradiction that it is exploration-separated. If not, then there is a realization ρ
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and a round t such that t is influencial w.r.t. ρ as well as not bid-dependent w.r.t.
ρ. Let round t be influencial with bid vector b, influencing agent l, and influenced
agents j and j′ 6= j in influenced round t′ (see 1 in Figure 3.1; all boxed numbers
in this sketch will refer to this figure).
From the assumption, t is not bid-dependent w.r.t. ρ, which means that there
exists a bid profile b′ such that i′ 6= l is played in round t with bids b′. Using
scalefreeness, IIA, and pointwise-monotonicity, we can prove that there exists a
sufficiently large bid b+i′ of agent i
′ such that she gets an impression in round t with
bids (b+i′ , b−i′) (see 2 ). Using the properties of the mechanism, it can further be
proved that there is an agent i such that she gets the impression in round t when
either i increases her bid, or l decreases her bid (see 3 ). When i increases her bid
to b+i , she also gets an impression in round t
′, since impressions cannot differ in
round t′ in the case when l is not played in round t and they must get transferred
from j and j′ to somebody in round t′, and IIA implies that this somebody should
be i.
Recall that two different players j and j′ get the impression in round t′ under
ρ and ρ′ respectively (see 4 ). We prove that either agent j′ or agent j must be
equal to l (this is done by looking at how the allocation in round t′ changes when l
decreases her bid). Let us break the symmetry and assume j′ = l (see box 5 ). It is
also easy to see that when i increases her bid, impression in round t′ get transferred
to her in ρ (at some minimum value b+ρi , see 6 ), and impression in round t
′ gets
transferred to her also in ρ′ (as some possibly different minimum value b+ρ
′
i , see
7 ). Using the assumptions of weakly-separatedness, we prove that b+ρi = b
+ρ′
i (see
8 ). This can be proved by observing that b+i ≥ max{b+ρi , b+ρ
′
i }, and then using
weakly-separatedness of A. Since these two bids were at a “threshold value” (these
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were the minimum values of bids to have transferred the impression in ρ and ρ′
from j and l respectively), we are able to prove that the ratio of bj/bl must be some
fixed number dependent on ρ, ρ′, and t′. In particular, it follows that bl belongs
to a finite set S(b−l) which depends only on b−l. However, by non-degeneracy of
A there must be infinitely many such bl’s, which leads to a contradiction.
In the rest of this section, we present the full proof of the “if” direction of
Lemma 3.5.10.
For bid profile b, realization ρ, agent l and round t, the tuple (b; ρ; l; t) is
called an influence-tuple if round t is (b, ρ)-influential with influencing agent l.
Suppose allocation A is weakly separated but not exploration-separated. Then
there is a counterexample: an influence-tuple (b; ρ; l; t) such that round t is not
bid-independent w.r.t. realization ρ. We prove that such counterexample can
occur only if bl ∈ Sl(b−l), for some finite set Sl(b−l) ⊂ R that depends only on b−l.
Proposition 3.5.11. Let A be as in Lemma 3.5.10. Assume A is weakly separated.
Then for each agent l and each bid profile b−l there exists a finite set Sl(b−l) ⊂ R
with the following property: for each counterexample (bl, b−l; ρ; l; t) it is the case
that bl ∈ Sl(b−l).
Once this proposition is proved, we obtain a contradiction with the non-
degeneracy of A. Indeed, suppose (b; ρ; l; t) is a counterexample. Then (b; ρ; l; t)
is an influence-tuple. Since A is non-degenerate, there exists a non-degenerate
interval I such that for each x ∈ I it holds that (x, b−l; ρ; l; t) is an influence-tuple,
and therefore a counterexample. Thus the set Sl(b−l) in Proposition 3.5.11 cannot
be finite, contradiction.
In the rest of this section we prove Proposition 3.5.11. Fix a counterexample
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(b; ρ; l; t); let t′ > t be the influenced round. In particular, A(b; ρ; t) = l (see 1
in Figure 3.1 on page 70; all boxed numbers will refer to this figure). Then by
the assumption there exist bids b′ such that A(b′; ρ; t) = i′ 6= l. We claim that
this implies that there exists a bid b+i′ > bi′ such that A(b+i′ , b−i′ ; ρ; t) = i′ (see 2 ).
This is proven in Lemma 3.5.13 below, and in order to prove it we first present
the following lemma, which essentially states that if the mechanism makes a choice
between i and j of who to be show, then it can only depend on the ratio of their
bids bidi/bidj, and not on the bids of other agents.
Lemma 3.5.12. Let A be an MAB (deterministic) allocation rule that is pointwise-
monotone, scalefree, and satisfies IIA. Let there be two bid profiles α and β such
that A(α; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j}, A(β; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j}, and αi/αj = βi/βj. Then it must be the
case that A(α; ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t).
Proof. As A is scalefree we assume that αi = βi and αj = βj by scaling bids in β
by a factor of αi/βi (or a factor of αj/βj), without changing the allocation.
Assume for the sake of a contradiction that A(β; ρ; t) 6= A(α; ρ; t). Let us num-
ber the agents as follows. Agents i and j are numbered 1 and 2, respectively. The
rest of the agents are arbitrarily numbered 3 to k. Consider the following sequence
of bid vectors. α(1) = α(2) = α and α(m) = (βm, α(m−1)−m) for m ∈ {3, . . . , k}.
As α(1) = α and α(k) = β, A(α(1); ρ; t) = A(α; ρ; t) and A(α(k); ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t).
Since A(α(k); ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t) 6= A(α; ρ; t) = A(α(1); ρ; t) there exists m ∈
{3, . . . , k} such that A(α(m − 1); ρ; t) = A(α; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} while A(α(m); ρ; t) 6=
A(α(m − 1); ρ; t). As m 6= i and m 6= j, IIA implies that A(α(m); ρ; t) = m
and given that, IIA also implies that A(α(k); ρ; t) ∈ {m,m + 1, . . . k} (note that
i, j are not in this set). But as A(α(k); ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} this yields a
contradiction.
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Lemma 3.5.13. Let A be an MAB (deterministic) allocation rule that is pointwise-
monotone, scalefree, and satisfies IIA. Let there be two bid profiles α and β such
that A(α; ρ; t) = i and A(β; ρ; t) = j 6= i. Then there exists β+i > βi such that
A(β+i , β−i; ρ; t) = i.
In other words, if it is possible for i to get the impression in round t at all, then
it is possible for her to get the impression starting from any bid profile and raising
her bid high enough.








. Consider a raised bid
of i from αi to α
+
i = αj · βiβj . In the bid profile (α+i , α−i), i must get the impres-
sion (by pointwise monotonicity). This gives a contradiction to Lemma 3.5.12,







A(α+i , α−i; ρ; t) 6= A(β; ρ; t).
Now, consider i increasing her bid in profile β to β+i = βj · αiαj . Now,




can apply Lemma 3.5.12 to deduce that A(α; ρ; t) = A(β+i , β−i; ρ; t) and both are
equal to i since the first allocation is equal to i.
From the lemma above, it follows that agent i′ can increase her bid (in bid
profile b) and get the impression in realization ρ, round t. To quantify by how
much agent i′ needs to raise her bid to get the impression, we introduce the notion
of threshold Θi,j(ρ; t) in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.5.14. Let A be an MAB (deterministic) allocation rule that is pointwise
monotone, scalefree and satisfies IIA. For realization ρ, round t, two agents i and
j 6= i, let bids b−i−j be such that there exist x0 and y satisfying A(x0, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) =
j, and there exists x (possibly dependent on y) satisfying A(x, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = i.
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Let us fix such a y and define8
Θ
b−i−j







∣∣ A(x, y, b−i; ρ; t) = i}.
Then for any bids b′−i−j, Θ
b′−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) is well defined and satisfies Θ
b′−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) =
Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ, t). We denote it by Θi,j(ρ, t), as Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) is independent of b−i−j.
Proof. We first prove that if the conditions of the definition of Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ; t) are
satisfied for b−i−j, then are also satisfied for any other b′−i−j. Let us say they are
satisfied for b−i−j, that is there exists x0, x and y, such that A(x0, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = j
and A(x, y, b−i; ρ; t) = i. We want to prove existence of x′ and y′ for b′−i−j. If
A(x0, y, b′−i−j; ρ; t) = j then existence of y′ is proved for b′−i−j too, since y′ = y
works. If not, then A(x0, y, b′−i−j; ρ; t) = j′ 6= j and A(x0, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = j, and
by Lemma 3.5.13, there exists a y′ > y such that A(x0, y′, b′−i−j; ρ; t) = j. Once
the existence of y′ is proved, we now prove the existence of x′. Let x′ = x · y′
y
≥ x.
We have A(x, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = i ∈ {i, j} and A(x′, y′, b′−i−j; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} by IIA (i
can only transfer impression to her by changing her bid) and x′/y′ = x/y. From
Lemma 3.5.12, we get i = A(x, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = A(x′, y′, b′−i−j; ρ; t). Hence the
existence of x′ is proved too.
For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that θ := Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ; t) <
Θ
b′−i−j
i,j (ρ; t) =: θ
′. Let us scale the bids in (x′, y′, b′−i−j) by a factor such that
the factor times y′ is equal to y. We can hence assume that y′ = y. Let us pick a
bid x′′ ∈ (θy, θ′y). We have A(x′′, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = i (since x′′/y is past the thresh-
old θ), A(x′′, y′ = y, b′−i−j; ρ; t) = j (x′′/y′ is yet not past the threshold θ′), and
8Note that if there are no values of bids of i (x0 and x) and j (equal to y) such that j can get
an impression with small enough bid (x0) of agent i and i can get an impression by raising her
bid (to x), then we don’t define Θb−i−ji,j (ρ; t) at all. We will be careful not to use such undefined
Θ’s. It is not hard to see that if bids are nonzero, then Θi,j(ρ; t) is defined if and only if Θj,i(ρ; t)
is. Moreover 0 < Θi,j(ρ; t) <∞, and Θj,i(ρ; t) = (Θi,j(ρ; t))−1.
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x′′/y = x′′/y′. This is a contradiction to the Lemma 3.5.12. Therefore, θ = θ′.
We conclude that if b+i′ > bl·Θi′,l(ρ, t) thenA(b+i′ , b−i′ ; ρ; t) = i′ 6= l (see 2 again).
Note that we are using Θi′,l(ρ; t) since this is well-defined. Define ρ
′ = ρ⊕ 1(l, t).
Let us think about decreasing the bid of agent l from bl (it is positive, since
all bids are assumed to be positive). When the bid of agent l is bl, she gets the
impression in round t, but when her bid is small enough (in particular as low as
bi′/Θi′,l(ρ; t)), then she must not get the impression in round t (see Lemma 3.5.12).
When the bid of l decreases, some other agent gets the impression in round t, let
us call that agent i (note that this agent may not be the same as agent i′ above).
See 3 .
Now, starting from bid profile b, let us increase the bid of agent i. When the
bid of agent i is large enough (in particular as large as biΘi′,l(ρ; t)bl/bi′), then l
can no longer get the impression in round t (see Lemma 3.5.12). From IIA, the
impression must get transferred to i. Therefore we can define Θi,l(ρ; t), and when
b+i > blΘi,l(ρ; t), agent i gets the impression in round t (see 3 again). Note that
A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t) = i (click information for l at round t cannot
influence the impression decision at round t).
Recall that t′ is the influenced round. Let A(b; ρ; t′) = j and let A(b; ρ′; t′) =
j′ 6= j (see 4 ). As A is pointwise monotone and IIA, A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) ∈ {i, j}
and A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′) ∈ {i, j′}. It must be the case that A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) =
A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′), as l does not get an impression at round t (and the algorithm
does not see the difference between ρ and ρ′). As j′ 6= j we conclude that
A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′) = i.
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Next we note that i 6= j and i 6= j′. This is because if i = j (respectively
i = j′), then round t would be (b; ρ)-influential (respectively (b; ρ′)-influential)
with influenced agent i but it is not (b; ρ)-secured (respectively (b; ρ′)-secured)
from i, in contradiction to the assumption.
We also note that l ∈ {j, j′} (see 5 ). Assume for the sake of contradiction
that l 6= j and l 6= j′. For b−l < bi · Θl,i(ρ, t) it holds that A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t) =
A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t) = i (since i was defined such that i gets the impression in round t
when l decreases her bid) thus A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t′) = A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t′) (as click informa-
tion for l at round t is not observed). (Also, as a side note, observe that b−l < bl by
pointwise-monotonicity since agent l was getting an impression in round t with bid
bl and lost it when her bid is b
−
l .) Let A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t′) = A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t′) = l′. Note
that l′ 6= l, since otherwise, Al(x, b−l; ρ; t′) is not a monotone function of x: it is 0
when x = bl (since j gets an impression), and 1 when x = b
−
l < bl, a contradiction
to pointwise-monotonicity. Now, note that the impression in ρ′ at time t′ transfers
from j′ to l′, and impression in ρ at time t′ transfers from j to l′, none of which
({j, j′, l′}) are equal to l and j 6= j′. Let us write this in equations:
A(bl, b−l; ρ; t′) = j A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t′) = l′
A(bl, b−l; ρ′; t′) = j′ A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t′) = l′.
It must be the case that either j 6= l′ or j′ 6= l′ (since j 6= j′). If j 6= l′, then in
ρ at time t′, reducing the bid of l transfers impression from j to l′ (both of them
are different from l), thus violating IIA. Similarly, if j′ 6= l′, then in ρ′ at time t′,
reducing the bid of l transfers impression from j′ to l′ (both of them are different
from l), thus violating IIA. We thus have l ∈ {j, j′}. Let l = j′ (since otherwise,
we can swap the roles of ρ and ρ′).
To summarize what we have proved so far: there are 3 distinct agents i, j, l
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such that
A(b; ρ; t) = A(b; ρ′; t) = A(b; ρ′; t′) = l (since A(b; ρ′; t′) = j′ = l),
A(b; ρ; t′) = j and
A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′) = i.
Observe also that Θi,l(ρ, t) = Θi,l(ρ
′, t) as ρ and ρ′ only differ at a click at round
t, and such a click cannot determine the allocation decision at round t. Also,
max{Θi,j(ρ, t′) · bj,Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl} ≤ Θi,l(ρ, t) · bl as the allocation at round t′, which
is different for ρ and ρ′ (at b), depends on l getting the impression at round t.9
Finally we prove that Θi,j(ρ, t
′) · bj= Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl (see 8 ).
Claim 3.5.15. Θi,j(ρ, t
′) · bj = Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl
Proof. First of all, note that Θi,j(ρ; t
′) and Θi,l(ρ′, t′) are well-defined. Let b¯i =
(Θi,j(ρ, t
′) · bj + Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl)/2. Consider the following two cases.
If Θi,j(ρ, t
′) · bj < Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl then round t is (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-influential
(as A(b¯i, b−i; ρ; t′) = i and A(b¯i, b−i; ρ′; t′) = l) with influencing agent l
(A(b¯i, b−i; ρ; t) = A(b¯i, b−i; ρ′; t) = l since b¯i < Θi,l(ρ, t) · bl) and influenced
agent i. Additionally, t it is not (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-secured from i (as A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) =
A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t) = i). A contradiction to first condition in the theorem.
Similarly, if Θi,j(ρ, t
′) · bj > Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl then round t is (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-influential
(as now A(b¯i, b−i; ρ; t′) = j and A(b¯i, b−i; ρ′; t′) = i) with influencing agent l and
influenced agent i. Additionally, t it is not (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-secured from i. Again, a
contradiction to the first condition in the theorem.




′; t′)bl. These are the bids of
agent i at which impression transfers to her in round t′ in ρ and ρ′ respectively. See 6 and 7 in
the figure.
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: all agents i, j 6= l, all realizations ρ, ρ′







This completes the proof of Proposition 3.5.11.
3.6 Lower bounds on regret
In this section we use structural results from the previous section to derive lower
bounds on regret.
Theorem 3.6.1. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k
agents. Let A be an exploration-separated deterministic allocation rule. Then its
regret is R(T ; vmax) = Ω(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3).
Let ~µ0 = (
1
2
, . . . , 1
2
) ∈ [0, 1]k be the vector of CTRs in which for each agent
the CTR is 1
2
. For each agent i, let ~µi = (µi1, . . . , µik) ∈ [0, 1]k be the vector of
CTRs in which agent i has CTR µii =
1
2
+ ,  = k1/3 T−1/3, and every other agent
j 6= i has CTR µij = 12 . As a notational convention, denote by Pi[·] and Ei[·]
respectively the probability and expectation induced by the algorithm when clicks
are given by ~µi. Let Ii be the problem instance in which CTRs are given by ~µi and
all bids are vmax. For each agent i, let Ji be the problem instance in which CTRs
are given by ~µ0, the bid of agent i is vmax, and the bids of all other agents are
vmax/2. We will show that for any exploration-separated deterministic allocation
rule A, one of these 2k instances causes high regret.
Let Ni be the number of bid-independent rounds in which agent i is played.
Note that Ni does not depend on the bids. It is a random variable in the probability
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space induced by the clicks; its distribution is completely specified by the CTRs.
We show that (in a certain sense) the allocation cannot distinguish between ~µ0 and
~µi if Ni is too small. Specifically, let At be the allocation in round t. Once the bids
are fixed, this is a random variable in the probability space induced by the clicks.
For a given set S of agents, we consider the event {At ∈ S} for some fixed round
t, and upper-bound the difference between the probability of this event under ~µ0
and ~µi in terms of Ei[Ni], in the following crucial claim, which we prove at the end
of this section (in Section 3.6.1).
Claim 3.6.2. For any fixed vector of bids, each round t, each agent i and each set
of agents S, we have





Proof of Theorem 3.6.1: Fix a positive constant β to be specified later. Consider
the case k = 2 first. If E0[Ni] > β T 2/3 for some agent i, then on the problem
instance Ji, regret is Ω(T 2/3). So without loss of generality let us assume E0[Ni] ≤
β T 2/3 for each agent i. Then, plugging in the values for  and E0[Ni], the right-
hand side of (3.6.1) is at most O(β). Take β so that the right-hand side of (3.6.1)
is at most 1
4
. For each round t there is an agent i such that P0[At 6= i] ≥ 12 . Then
Pi[At 6= i] ≥ 14 by Claim 3.6.2, and therefore in this round algorithm A incurs
regret Ω( vmax) under problem instance Ii. By Pigeonhole Principle there exists
an i such that this happens for at least half of the rounds t, which gives the desired
lower-bound.
Case k ≥ 3 requires a different (and somewhat more complicated) argument.
Let R = β k1/3 T 2/3 and N be the number of bid-independent rounds. Assume
E0[N ] > R. Then E0[Ni] ≤ 1k E0[N ] for some agent i. For the problem instance
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Ji there are, in expectation, E[N −Ni] = Ω(R) bid-independent rounds in which
agent i is not played; each of which contributes Ω(vmax) to regret, so the total
regret is Ω(vmaxR).
From now on assume that E0[N ] ≤ R. Note that by Pigeonhole Principle, there
are more than k
2
agents i such that E0[Ni] ≤ 2R/k. Furthermore, let us say that
an agent i is good if P0[At = i] ≤ 45 for more than T/6 different rounds t. We claim
that there are more than k
2
good agents. Suppose not. If agent i is not good then

















≥ kT/3 ≥ T,
contradiction. Claim proved. It follows that there exists a good agent i such that
E0[Ni] ≤ 2R/k. Therefore the right-hand side of (3.6.1) is at most O(β). Pick
β so that the right-hand side of (3.6.1) is at most 1
10
. Then by Claim 3.6.2 for
at least T/6 different rounds t we have Pi[At = i] ≤ 910 . In each such round, if
agent i is not played then algorithm A incurs regret Ω( vmax) on problem instance
Ii. Therefore, the (total) regret of A on problem instance Ii is Ω( vmax T ) =
Ω(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3).
Theorem 3.6.3. In the setting of Theorem 3.6.1, fix k and vmax and assume
that R(T ; vmax) = O(vmax T
γ) for some γ < 1. Then for every fixed δ ≤ 1
4
and
λ < 2(1− γ) we have Rδ(T ; vmax) = Ω(δ vmax T λ).
Proof. Fix λ ∈ (0, 2(1 − γ)). Redefine ~µi’s with respect to a different , namely
 = T−λ/2. Define the problem instances Ii in the same way as before: all bids are
vmax, the CTRs are given by ~µi.
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Let us focus on agents 1 and 2. We claim that E1[N1] + E2[N2] ≥ β T λ, where
β > 0 is a constant to be defined later. Suppose not. Fix all bids to be vmax. For
each round t, consider event St = {At = 1}. Then by Claim 3.6.2 we have
∣∣P1[St]− P2[St]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣P0[St]− P1[St]∣∣+ ∣∣P0[St]− P2[St]∣∣




for a sufficiently small β. Now, P1[St] ≥ 12 for at least T/2 rounds t. This is
because otherwise on problem instance Ii regret would be R(T ) ≥ Ω( Tvmax) =
Ω(vmax T
1−λ/2), which contradicts the assumption R(T ) = O(vmax T γ). Therefore
P2[St] ≥ 14 for at least T/2 rounds t, hence on problem instance I2 regret is at least
Ω( Tvmax), contradiction. Claim proved.
Now without loss of generality let us assume that E1[N1] ≥ β2 T λ. Consider
the problem instance in which CTRs given by ~µ1, bid of agent 2 is vmax, and all
other bids are vmax(1− 2δ)/(1 + 2). It is easy to see that this problem instance
has δ-gap. Each time agent 1 is selected, algorithm incurs regret Ω(δvmax). Thus
the total regret is at least Ω(δN1 vmax) = Ω(δ vmax T
λ).
3.6.1 Relative entropy: Proof of Claim 3.6.2
In this section, we extend the relative entropy technique from Auer et al. (2002b).
All relevant facts about relative entropy are summarized in the theorem below.
We will need the following definition: given a random variable X on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), let PX be the distribution of X, i.e. a measure on R defined by
PX(x) = P[X = x].
Theorem 3.6.4. Let p and q be two probability measures on a finite set U , and
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let Y and Z be functions on U . There exists a function F (p; q|Y ) : U → R with
the following properties:
(i) Ep F (p; q|Y ) = Ep F (p; q|(Y, Z)) + Ep F (pZ ; qZ |Y ) (chain rule),
(ii)
∣∣p(U ′) − q(U ′)∣∣ ≤ √1
2
D(p‖q) for any event U ′ ⊂ U , where D(p‖q) =
Ep F (p; q|1)
(iii) for each x ∈ U , if conditional on the event {Z = Z(x)} p coincides with q,
then F (p; q|Z)(x) = 0.
(iv) for each x ∈ U , if conditional on the event {Z = Z(x)} p and q are fair and
(1
2
+ )-biased coins, respectively, then it is the case that F (p; q|Z)(x) ≤ 42.
Remark. This theorem summarizes several well-known facts about relative entropy
(albeit in a somewhat non-standard notation). For the proofs, see Cover and
Thomas (1991); Kleinberg (2005, 2007b). In the proofs, one defines F = F (p; q|Y )
as a function F : U → R which is specified by F (x) = ∑x′∈U p(x′|Ux) lg p(x′|Ux)q(x′|Ux) ,
where Ux is the event {Y = Y (x)}.10 Note that the quantity Ep F (p; q|1) is pre-
cisely the relative entropy (a.k.a. KL-divergence), commonly denoted D(p‖q), and
Ep F (p; q|Y ) is the corresponding conditional relative entropy.
In what follows we use Theorem 3.6.4 to prove Claim 3.6.2. For simplicity we
will prove (3.6.1) for i = 1.
The history up to round t is Ht = (h1, h2 , . . . , ht) where hs ∈ {0, 1} is the click
or no click event received by the algorithm at round s. Let Ct be the indicator func-
tion of the event “round t is bid-independent”. Define the bid-independent history
as Ĥt = (ĥ1, ĥ2 , . . . , ĥt), where ĥt = htCt. For any exploration-separated deter-
ministic allocation rule and each round t, the bid-independent history Ĥt−1 and the
10We use the convention that p(x) log(p(x)/q(x)) is 0 when p(x) = 0, and +∞ when p(x) > 0
and q(x) = 0.
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bids completely determine which arm is chosen in this round. Moreover, Ĥt−1 alone
(without the bids) completely determines whether round t is bid-independent, and
if so, which arm is chosen in this round.
Recall the CTR vectors ~µi as defined in Section 3.6. Let p and q be the
distributions induced on ĤT by ~µ0 and ~µ1, respectively. Let pt and qt be the
distributions induced on ĥt by ~µ0 and ~µ1, respectively. Let Ht the support of Ĥt,
i.e. the set of all t-bit vectors. In the forthcoming applications of Theorem 3.6.4,
the universe will be U = HT . By abuse of notation, we will treat Ĥt as a projection
HT → Ht, so that it can be considered a random variable under p or q.
Claim 3.6.5. D(p‖q) = Ep F (p; q| Ĥt) +
∑t
s=1Ep F (ps; qs| Ĥs−1) for any t > 1.
Proof. Use induction on t ≥ 0 (set Ĥ0 = 1). In order to obtain the claim for a
given t assuming that it holds for t − 1, apply Theorem 3.6.4(i) with Y = Ĥt−1
and Z = ĥt.
Claim 3.6.6. F (pt; qt| Ĥt−1) ≤ 42 Ct 1{At=1} for each round t.
Proof. We are interested in the function F = F (pt; qt| Ĥt−1) : HT → R. Given
Ĥt−1, one of the following three cases occurs:
• round t is not bid-independent. Then ĥt = 0, hence F (·) = 0 by Theo-
rem 3.6.4(iii),
• round t is bid-independent and arm 1 is not played. Then ĥt is distributed
as a fair coin under both p and q, so again F (·) = 0.
• round t is bid-independent and arm 1 is played. Then F (·) ≤ 42 by Theo-
rem 3.6.4(iv).
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Given the full bid-independent history ĤT , p and q become (the same) point
measure, so by Theorem 3.6.4(iii) Ep F (p; q| ĤT ) = 0. Therefore taking Claim 3.6.5




Ep F (pt; qt| Ĥt−1) = 42
T∑
t=1
Ep [Ct 1{At=1}] = 4
2 Ep[N1]. (3.6.2)
For a given round t and fixed bids, the allocation at round t is completely de-
termined by the bid-independent history Ĥt−1. Thus, we can treat {At ∈ S} as
an event in HT . Now (3.6.1) follows from (3.6.2) via an application of Theo-
rem 3.6.4(ii) with U ′ = {At ∈ S}.
3.7 Matching upper bound
Let us describe a very simple mechanism, called the naive MAB mechanism, which
matches the lower bound from Theorem 3.6.1 up to polylogarithmic factors (and
also the lower bound from Theorem 3.6.3, for γ = λ = 2
3
and constant δ).11
Fix the number of agents k, the time horizon T , and the bid vector b. The
mechanism has two phases. In the exploration phase, each agent is played for
T0 := k
−2/3 T 2/3(log T )1/3 rounds, in a round robin fashion. Let ci be the number
of clicks on agent i in the exploration phase. In the exploitation phase, an agent
i∗ ∈ argmaxi cibi is chosen and played in all remaining rounds. Payments are
defined as follows: agent i∗ pays maxi∈[k]\{i∗} cibi/ci∗ for every click she gets in
exploitation phase, and all others pay 0. (Exploration rounds are free for every
agent.) This completes the description of the mechanism.
11Independently, Devanur and Kakade Devanur and Kakade (2009) presented a version of the
naive MAB mechanism that achieves the same regret even in the more general model in which
the value-per-click of an agent changes over time and the agents are allowed to submit a different
bid at every round. Instead of assigning all impressions to the same agent in the exploitation
phase, their mechanism runs the same allocation and payment procedure for each exploration
round separately (see Devanur and Kakade (2009) for details).
85
Observation 3.7.1. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with
k agents. The naive mechanism is normalized, truthful and has worst-case regret
R(T ; vmax) = O(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3 log2/3 T ).
Proof. The mechanism is truthful by a simple second-price argument.12 Recall that
ci is the number of clicks i got in the exploration phase. Let pi = maxj 6=i cjbj/ci be
the price paid (per click) by agent i if she wins (all) rounds in exploitation phase.
If vi ≥ pi, then by bidding anything greater than pi agent i gains vi − pi utility
each click irrespective of her bid, and bidding less than vi, she gains 0, so bidding
vi is weakly dominant. Similarly, if vi < pi, then by bidding anything less than
pi she gains 0, while bidding bi > pi, she loses bi − pi each click. So bidding vi is
weakly dominant in this case too.
For the regret bound, let (µ1 , . . . , µk) be the vector of CTRs, and let
µ¯i = ci/T0 be the sample CTRs. By Chernoff bounds, for each agent i we have
Pr [|µ¯i − µi| > r] ≤ T−4, for r =
√
8 log(T )/T0. If in a given run of the mecha-
nism all estimates µ¯i lie in the intervals specified above, call the run clean. The
expected regret from the runs that are not clean is at most O(vmax), and can thus
be ignored. From now on let us assume that the run is clean.
The regret in the exploration phase is at most
k T0 vmax = O
(
vmax k
1/3 T 2/3 log1/3 T
)
.
For the exploitation phase, let j = argmaxi µibi. Then (since we assume that the
run is clean) we have
(µi∗ + r) bi∗ ≥ µ¯i∗ bi∗ ≥ µ¯j bj ≥ (µj − r) bj,
12Alternatively, one can use Theorem 3.5.8 since all exploration rounds are bid-independent,
and only exploration rounds are influential, and the payments are exactly as defined in Theo-
rem 3.5.1.
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which implies µjvj − µi∗vi∗ ≤ r(vj + vi∗) ≤ 2r vmax. Therefore, the regret in
exploitation phase is at most 2r vmax T = O(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3 log2/3 T ). Therefore the
total regret is as claimed.
3.8 Extensions
We extend our results in several directions. In this section, we first describe the
extensions, and then present them in turn in subsequent subsections.
First, we derive a regret lower bound for deterministic truthful mechanisms
without assuming that the allocations are scale-free. In particular, for two agents
there are no assumptions. This lower bound holds for any k (the number of agents)
assuming IIA, but unlike the one in Theorem 3.6.1 it does not depend on k.
Second, we extend our results to randomized mechanisms. We consider ran-
domized mechanisms that are universally truthful, i.e. truthful for each realization
of the internal random seed. For mechanisms that randomize over exploration-
separated deterministic allocation rules, we obtain the same lower bounds as in
Theorems 3.6.1 and Theorem 3.6.3.
Third, we consider randomized allocation rules under a weaker version of truth-
fulness: a mechanism is weakly truthful if for each realization, it is truthful in ex-
pectation over its random seed. We show that any randomized allocation that is
“pointwise monotone” and satisfies a certain notion of “separation between explo-
ration and exploitation” can be turned into a mechanism that is weakly truthful
and normalized. Then we apply this result to an algorithm in the literature (Awer-
buch and Kleinberg, 2008; Kleinberg, 2007a) in order to obtain regret guarantees
for the version of the MAB mechanism design problem in which the clicks are
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chosen by an oblivious adversary.13 (This version corresponds to the adversarial
MAB problem (Auer et al., 2002b; Dani and Hayes, 2006; Abernethy et al., 2008;
Bartlett et al., 2008).) The upper bound matches our lower bound for deterministic
allocations up to (log k)1/3 factors.
Fourth, we consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem under a
more relaxed notion of truthfulness: truthfulness in expectation, where for each
vector of CTRs the expectation is taken over clicks (and the internal randomness
in the mechanism, if the latter is not deterministic). Following our line of investiga-
tion, we ask whether restricting a mechanism to be truthful in expectation has any
implications on the structure and regret thereof. Given our results on mechanisms
that are truthful and normalized, it is tempting to seek similar results for mech-
anisms that are truthful in expectation and normalized in expectation.14 We rule
out this approach: we show that in order to obtain any non-trivial lower bounds
on regret and (essentially) any non-trivial structural results, one needs to assume
that a mechanism is ex-post normalized, at least in some approximate sense. The
key idea is to view the allocation and the payment as multivariate polynomials
over the CTRs.
We now describe these extensions in turn.
3.8.1 Lower bound for non-scalefree allocations
In this section we derive a regret lower bound for deterministic truthful mechanisms
without assuming that the allocations are scale-free. In particular, for two agents
13An oblivious adversary chooses the entire realization in advance, without observing algo-
rithm’s behavior and its random seed.
14A mechanism is normalized in expectation if in expectation over clicks (and possibly over the
allocation’s randomness), each agent is charged an amount between 0 and her bid for each click
she receives.
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there are no assumptions. This lower bound holds for any k (the number of agents)
assuming that the allocation satisfies IIA, but unlike the one in Theorem 3.6.1 it
does not depend on k.
Theorem 3.8.1. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with
k agents. Let (A,P) be a normalized truthful mechanism such that A is a non-
degenerate deterministic allocation rule. Suppose A satisfies IIA. Then its regret
is R(T ; vmax) = Ω(vmax T
2/3) for any sufficiently large vmax.
Note that the theorem does not assume scalefreeness of the mechanism.
Let us sketch the proof. Fix an allocation A. In Definition 3.5.4, if round t
is (b, ρ) influential, for some realization ρ and bid vector b, an agent i is called
strongly influenced by round t if it is one of the two agents that are “influenced”
by round t but is not the “influencing agent” of round t. In particular, it holds
that A(b, ρ, t) 6= i. For each realization ρ, round t and agent i, if there exists a
bid vector b such that round t is (b, ρ)-influential with strongly influenced agent
i, then fix any one such b, and define b∗i = b
∗
i (ρ, t) := maxj 6=i bj. Let us define
B∗A = maxρ,t,i b
∗
i (ρ, t), where the maximum is taken over all realizations ρ, all
rounds t, and all agents i. Let us say that round t is B∗-free from agent i w.r.t
realization ρ, if for this realization the following property holds: agent i is not
selected in round t as long as each bid is at least B∗.
Lemma 3.8.2. In the setting of Theorem 3.8.1, for any realization ρ, any influ-
ential round t is B∗A-free from some agent w.r.t. ρ.
Proof. Fix realization ρ. Since round t is influential, for some bid profile b and
agent i it is (b, ρ)-influential with a strongly influenced agent i. By definition of
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b∗i (ρ, t), without loss of generality each bid in b (other than i’s bid) is at most
b∗i (ρ, t) ≤ B∗A. Then A(b, ρ, t) 6= i, and round t is (b, ρ)-secured from agent i.
Suppose round t is not B∗A-free from agent i w.r.t ρ. Then there exists a bid
profile b′ in which each bid (other than i’s bid) is at least B∗A such that A(b′, ρ, t) =
i. To derive a contradiction, let us transform b to b′ by adjusting first the bid of
agent i and then bids of agents j 6= i one agent at a time. Initially agent i is not
chosen in round t, and after the last step of this transformation agent i is chosen.
Thus it is chosen at some step, say when we adjust the bid of agent i or some agent
j 6= i. This transfer of impression to agent i cannot happen when bid of agent i is
adjusted from bi to b
′
i (since round t is (b; ρ)-secured from i), and it cannot happen
when bid of player j 6= i is adjusted from bj to b′j ≥ bj (this is because, the transfer
to i cannot happen from j because of pointwise-monotonicity and the transfer to
i cannot happen from l 6= j because of IIA). This is a contradiction.
Let T be the time horizon. Assume vmax ≥ 2B∗A. Let N(ρ) be the number
of influential rounds w.r.t realization ρ. Let Ni(ρ) be the number of influential
rounds w.r.t. realization ρ that are B∗A-free from agent i w.r.t. ρ. Then N and
the Ni’s are random variables in the probability space induced by the clicks. By
Lemma 3.8.2 we have that
∑
iNi(ρ) is at least the number of influential rounds.




E0[·] denote expectation w.r.t. ~µ0.
Fix a constant β > 0 to be specified later. If E0[N ] ≥ βk T 2/3 then E0[Ni] ≥
β T 2/3 for some agent i, so the allocation incurs expected regret R(T ; vmax) ≥
Ω(vmax T
2/3) on any problem instance Jj, j 6= i. (In this problem instance, CTRs
given by ~µ0, the bid of agent j is vmax, and all other bids are vmax/2.) Now
suppose E0[N ] ≤ βk T 2/3. Then the desired regret bound follows by an argument
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very similar to the one in the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.6.1.
3.8.2 Universally truthful randomized mechanisms
Consider randomized mechanisms that are universally truthful, i.e. truthful for
each realization of the internal random seed. For mechanisms that randomize over
exploration-separated deterministic mechanisms, we obtain the same lower bounds
as in Theorems 3.6.1 and Theorem 3.6.3.
Theorem 3.8.3. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let D distribu-
tion over exploration-separated deterministic allocation rules. Then
EA∈D [RA(T ; vmax)] = Ω(vmax k1/3 T 2/3).
Proof Sketch. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 3.6.1 we define a family F of 2k
problem instances, and show that if A is an exploration-separated deterministic
allocation rule, then on one of these instances its regret is “high”. In fact, we
can extend this analysis to show that the regret is “high”, that is at least R∗ =
Ω(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3), on an instance I ∈ F chosen uniformly at random from F ; here
regret is in expectation over the choice of I.15 Once this is proved, it follows that
regret is R∗/2 for any distribution over such A, in expectation over both the choice
of A and the choice of I. Thus there exists a single (deterministic) instance I such
that EA∈D [RA,I(T )] ≥ R∗/2.
Theorem 3.6.3 extends similarly.
15This extension requires but minor modifications to the proof of Theorem 3.6.1. For instance,
for the case k ≥ 3 we argue that first, if E0[N ] > R then E0[Ni] ≤ 2kE0[N ] for at least k2 agents
i (and so on), and if E0[N ] ≤ R then (omitting some details) there are Ω(k) good agents i such
that E0[Ni] ≤ 2R/k (and so on).
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3.8.3 Randomized allocations and adversarial clicks
In this section we discuss randomized allocations and the version of the MAB
mechanism design problem when clicks are generated adversarially, termed the
adversarial MAB problem. In this version, the objective is to optimize the worst-
case regret over all values v = (v1 , . . . , vk) such that vi ∈ [0, vmax] for each i, and
all realizations ρ:














vi ρi(t) E [Ai(v; ρ; t)] (3.8.1)
R(T ; vmax) = max{R(T ; v; ρ) : all realizations ρ,
all v such that vi ∈ [0, vmax] for each i}.
The first term in (3.8.1) is the social welfare from the best time-invariant allocation,
the second term is the social welfare generated by A.
Let us make a few definitions related to truthfulness. Recall that a mechanism
is called weakly truthful if for each realization, it is truthful in expectation over its
random seed. A randomized allocation is pointwise monotone if for each realization
and each bid profile, increasing the bid of any one agent does not decrease the
probability of this agent being allocated in any given round. For a set S of rounds
and a function σ : S → {agents}, an allocation is (S, σ)-separated if (i) it coincides
with σ on S, (ii) the clicks from the rounds not in S are discarded (not reported
to the algorithm). An allocation is strongly separated if before round 1, without
looking at the bids, it randomly chooses a set S of rounds and a function σ : S →
{agents}, and then runs a pointwise monotone (S, σ)-separated allocation. Note
that the choice of S and σ is independent of the clicks, by definition.
We show that for any (randomized) strongly separated allocation rule A there
exists a payment rule which results in a mechanism that is weakly truthful and
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normalized. Then we consider PSim (Awerbuch and Kleinberg, 2008; Kleinberg,
2007a), a randomized MAB algorithm from the literature, and show that it is point-
wise monotone and strongly separated. When interpreted as an allocation rule,
there algorithm has strong regret guarantees for the adversarial MAB mechanism
design problem, where the clicks are chosen by an oblivious adversary. Specifically,
PSim obtains regret R(T, vmax) = O(vmax k
1/3 (log k)1/3 T 2/3).
We start with the structural result.
Lemma 3.8.4. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a (ran-
domized) strongly separated allocation rule. Then there exists a payment rule P
such that the resulting mechanism (A,P) is normalized and weakly truthful.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let us fix a realization ρ, time horizon T , bid vector
b, and agent i. We will consider the payment of agent i. We will vary the bid of
agent i on the interval [0, bi]; the bids b−i of all other agents always stay the same.
Let ci(x) be the number of clicks received by agent i given that her bid is x.
Then by (the appropriate version of) Theorem 3.5.1 the payment of agent i must









where the expectation is taken over the internal randomness in the algorithm.
Recall that initially A randomly selects, without looking at the bids, a set
S of rounds and a function σ : S → {agents}, and then runs some pointwise
monotone (S, σ)-separated allocation A(S,σ). In what follows, let us fix S and σ,
and denote A∗ = A(S,σ). We will refer to the rounds in S as exploration rounds,
and to the rounds not in S as exploitation rounds. Let γ∗i (x, t) be the probability
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that algorithm A∗ allocates agent i in round t given that agent i bids x. Note
that for fixed value of internal random seed of A∗ this probability can only depend
on the clicks observed in exploration rounds, which are known to the mechanism.
Therefore, abstracting away the computational issues, we can assume that it is
known to the mechanism. Define the payment rule as follows: in each exploitation
round t in which agent i is chosen and clicked, charge





γ∗i (x, t) dx. (3.8.3)




ρi(t) A∗i (b; ρ; t) P∗i (b, t). (3.8.4)
Since allocation A∗ is pointwise monotone, the probability γ∗i (x, t) is non-
decreasing in x. Therefore P∗i (b, t) ∈ [0, bi] for each round t. It follows that
the mechanism is normalized (for any realization of the random seed of allocation
A).
It remains to check that the payment rule (3.8.3) results in (3.8.2). Let c∗i (x)
be the number of clicks allocated to agent i by allocation A∗ given that her bid is
x. Let cexpli (x) be the corresponding number of clicks in exploitation rounds only.
Since A∗ is (S, σ)-separated, we have
E[c∗i (x)− cexpli (x)] =
∑
t∈S
ρσ(t)(t) = const(x). (3.8.5)




















































Finally, taking expectations over the choice of S and σ, we obtain (3.8.2).
Algorithm PSim is strongly separated
In this subsection, we consider PSim (Awerbuch and Kleinberg, 2008; Kleinberg,
2007a), an algorithm for the adversarial MAB problem. We interpret this algorithm
as an allocation rule, and observe that it is strongly separated.
As usual, k denotes the number of agents; let [k] denote the set of agents. The
algorithm is shown in Figure 3.2.
If we pick the values  = (k log k/T )1/3 and P = (log k)1/3(T/k)2/3, then the re-
gret of PSim is bounded by O((k log k)1/3T 2/3vmax) against any oblivious adversary
(see (Awerbuch and Kleinberg, 2008; Kleinberg, 2007a)).
We next prove that PSim is strongly-separated.
It is clear from the structure of PSim above that it chooses a set S of explo-
ration rounds and a function f : S → [k] in the beginning without looking at
the bids and then runs an (S, f)-separated allocation. We need to prove that the
(S, f)-separated allocation is pointwise monotone. For this we need prove that
the probability γi(b; t;S, f) is monotone in the bid of agent i, where γi(b; t;S, f)
denotes the probability of picking agent i in round t when bids are b given the
choice of S and f . If t ∈ S, the γi(b; t;S, f) is independent of bids, and hence is
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1 INPUT: Time horizon T , bid vector b. Let vmax = maxi bi.
2 OUTPUT: For each round t ≤ T , a distribution on [k].
3 Divide the time horizon into P phases of T/P consecutive rounds each.
4 From rounds of each phase p, pick without replacement some k rounds at
random (called the exploration rounds) and assign them randomly to k arms.
Let S denote the set of all exploration rounds (of all phases). Let
f : S → [k] be the function which tells which arm is assigned to an
exploration round in S. The rounds in [T ] \ S are called the exploitation
rounds.
5 Let wi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ [k].
6 FOR each phase p = 1, 2, . . . , P
7 FOR each round t in phase p
8 IF t ∈ S and f(t) = i
9 Define the distribution γ(b; t;S, f) such that
γi(b; t;S, f) = 1.
10 Pick an agent according to this distribution (
equivalently, pick agent i), observe the click ρi(t),
and update wi(p) multiplicatively by
wi(p) = wi(p− 1) · (1 + )ρi(t)bi/vmax .
11 IF t 6∈ S
12 Define the distribution γ(b; t;S, f) such that
γi(b; t;S, f) =
wi(p−1)P
j wj(p−1) .
13 Pick an agent according to γ(b; t;S, f), observe the
feedback, and discard the feedback.
Figure 3.2: The PSim algorithm.
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monotone in bi. Let t 6∈ S and t is a round in phase p. Let us denote by f−1(i, p)
the (unique) exploration round in phase p assigned to agent i. We then have














We split the denominator into the term for agent i and all other terms. It is then
not hard to see that this is a non-decreasing function of bi.
We state the above results in the form of the following corollary.
Corollary 3.8.5. There exists a weakly truthful normalized mechanism for the
adversarial MAB problem (against oblivious adversary) whose regret grows as
O((k log k)1/3 · T 2/3 · vmax).
3.8.4 Truthfulness in expectation over CTRs
We consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem under a more relaxed
notion of truthfulness: truthfulness in expectation, where for each vector of CTRs
the expectation is taken over clicks (and the internal randomness in the mecha-
nism, if the latter is not deterministic). We show that any allocation A∗ that is
monotone in expectation,16 can be converted to a mechanism that is truthful in
expectation and monotone in expectation, with minor changes and a very minor
increase in regret. Furthermore, we show that there exist MAB allocations that
are monotone in expectation whose regret matches the optimal upper bounds for
MAB algorithms. The conclusion is that in order to obtain any non-trivial lower
bounds on regret and (essentially) any non-trivial structural results, one needs
16Monotonicity in expectation is defined in an obvious way: an allocation is monotone in
expectation if for each agent i and fixed bid profile b−i, the corresponding expected click-allocation
is a non-decreasing function of bi; here the expectation is taken over the clicks and possibly the
allocation’s random seed.
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to assume that a mechanism is ex-post normalized, at least in some approximate
sense.
The main result of this section is that for any allocation A∗ that is monotone
in expectation, any time horizon T , and any parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a
mechanism (A,P) such that the mechanism is truthful in expectation and nor-
malized in expectation, and allocation A initially makes a random choice between
A∗ and some other allocation, choosing A∗ with probability at least γ. We call
such allocation A a γ-approximation of A∗. Clearly, on any problem instance we
have RA(T ) ≤ γ RA∗(T ) + (1− γ)T . The extra additive factor of (1− γ)T is not
significant if e.g. γ = 1 − 1
T
. The problem with this mechanism is that it is not
ex-post normalized; moreover, in some realizations payments may be very large in
absolute value.
Theorem 3.8.6. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k
agents and a fixed time horizon T . For each γ ∈ (0, 1) and each allocation rule
A∗ that is monotone in expectation, there exists a mechanism (A,P) such that
A is a γ-approximation of A∗, and the mechanism is truthful in expectation and
normalized in expectation.
Remark. Payment rule P is well-defined as a mapping from histories to numbers.
We do not make any claims on the efficient computability thereof.
For the sake of completeness, we provide a concrete algorithm which one could
plug into Theorem 3.8.6 and obtain improved (and in fact, best possible) regret
guarantees.
Proposition 3.8.7. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with
k agents and a fixed time horizon T . There exists an allocation rule A that is
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monotone in expectation, whose regret is R(T ; vmax) = O(vmax
√
kT log T ) in the
worst case, and Rδ(T ; vmax) = O(vmax
k
δ
log T ) on the δ-gap instances.
Proof Sketch. For simplicity, assume vmax = 1. Let r0 =
√
8 log(T )/T . Consider
the following simple allocation. Initially, each agent is active. In each phase, play
each active agent once, in a round-robin fashion. After the phase, (permanently)
de-activate each agent whose sample product (sample average times the bid) is more
than r0 below that of some other active agent. This completes the description of
the allocation.
This allocation is based on a well-known (perhaps folklore) MAB algorithm.
The regret bounds are proved along the lines of those in Auer et al. (2002b) (also
see Section 2.3). The crucial observations are that with a very high probability
the optimal agent is never de-activated, and that that each sub-optimal agent i is
played at most O(∆−2i log T ) times, where ∆i is the difference between her product
(CTR times the bid) and the maximal one.
The allocation is monotone in expectation because increasing the bid of a given
agent cannot cause this agent to be de-activated later.
Proof of Theorem 3.8.6
Let Aexpl be the allocation rule where in each round an agent is chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly at random. Allocation A is defined as follows: use A∗ with
probability γ; otherwise use Aexpl. Fix an instance (b, µ) of the stochastic MAB
mechanism design problem, where b = (b1 , . . . , bk) and µ = (µ1 , . . . , µk) are
vectors of bids and CTRs, respectively. Let Ci = Ci(bi; b−i) be the expected num-
ber of clicks for agent i under the original allocation A∗. Then by Myerson (1981)
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The key idea is to treat the expected payment as a multivariate polynomial over
µ1 , . . . , µk. It is essential (given the way we define P) to show that this polynomial
has degree ≤ T .
Claim 3.8.8. PMi is a polynomial of degree ≤ T in variables µ1 , . . . , µk.
Proof. Fix the bid profile. Let Xt be allocation of algorithm A∗. Let poly(T ) be
the set of all polynomials over µ1 , . . . , µk of degree at most T . Consider a fixed
history h = (x1, y1; . . . ;xT , yT ), and let h
t be the corresponding history up to
(and including) round t. Then
P[h] =
∏T
t=1 Pr[Xt = xt |ht−1] µytxt (1− µxt)1−yt ∈ poly(T ) (3.8.7)
Ci(bi; b−i) =
∑
h∈H P[h] #clicksi(h) ∈ poly(T ). (3.8.8)
Therefore PMi ∈ poly(T ), since one can take an integral in (3.8.6) separately over
the coefficient of each monomial of Ci(x; b−i).
Fix time horizon T . For a given run of an allocation rule, the history is defined
as h = (x1, y1; . . . ;xT , yT ), where xt is the allocation in round t, and yt ∈ {0, 1}
is the corresponding click. Let H be the set of all possible histories.
Our payment rule P is a deterministic function of history. For each agent i,
we define the payment Pi = Pi(h) for each history h such that Eh[Pi(h)] = PMi
for any choice of CTRs, and hence Eh[Pi(h)] ≡ PMi , where ≡ denotes an equality
between polynomials over µ1 , . . . , µk.
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Fix the bid vector and fix agent i. We define the payment Pi as follows. Charge
nothing if allocation A∗ is used. If allocation Aexpl is used, charge per monomial.
Specifically, let mono(T ) be the set of all monomials over µ1 , . . . , µk of degree at
most T . For each monomial Q ∈ mono(T ) we define a subset of relevant histories
Hi(Q) ⊂ H. (We defer the definition till later in the proof.) For a given history




deg(Q) PMi (Q), (3.8.9)
where deg(Q) is the degree of Q, and PMi (Q) is the coefficient of Q in PMi . Let





deg(Q) Pexpl[Hi(Q)] PMi (Q).
Therefore in order to guarantee that Eh[Pi(h)] ≡ PMi it suffices to choose Hi(Q)
for each Q so that
kdeg(Q) Pexpl[Hi(Q)] ≡ Q. (3.8.10)
Consider a monomial Q = µα11 . . . µ
αk
k . Let Hi(Q) consist of all histories such that
first agent 1 is played α1 times in a row, and clicked every time, then agent 2 is
played α2 times in a row, and clicked every time, and so on till agent k. In the
remaining T − deg(Q) rounds, any agent can be chosen, and any outcome (click
or no click) can be received. It is clear that (3.8.10) holds.
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CHAPTER 4
SLEEPING EXPERTS AND BANDITS PROBLEM
In this chapter, we describe a version of the online-learning problem where the
set of available actions is allowed to vary over time. We repeat the common defi-
nition from the introduction, to remind the reader of the settings of this problem.
4.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, in on-line decision problems, or sequential prediction
problems, an algorithm must choose, in each of the T consecutive rounds, one of the
n possible actions (as a slight change of notation from previous chapters, we use n
to denote the number of options, instead of K). In each round, each action receives
a real valued positive payoff in [0, 1], initially unknown to the algorithm. At the
end of each round the algorithm receives some information about the payoffs of the
actions in that round. The goal of the algorithm is to maximize the total payoff,
i.e. the sum of the payoffs of the chosen actions in each round. The standard
on-line decision settings are the best expert setting (or the full-information setting)
in which, at the end of the round, the payoffs of all n strategies are revealed to the
algorithm, and the multi-armed bandit setting (or the partial-information setting)
in which only the payoff of the chosen strategy is revealed. Customarily, in the
best expert setting the strategies are called experts and in the multi-armed bandit
setting the strategies are called bandits or arms. We use actions to generically refer
to both types of strategies, when we do not refer particularly to either.
In the prior-free setting (as is the case in this chapter), the performance of the
algorithm is typically measured in terms of regret. (See (Gittins, 1979), (Gittins
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and Jones, 1979) for maximization of expected reward in the Bayesian setting.)
The regret is the difference between the expected payoff of the algorithm and the
payoff of a single fixed strategy for selecting actions. The usual single fixed strategy
to compare against is the one which always selects the expert or bandit that has
the highest total payoff over the T rounds in hindsight.
The usual assumption in online learning problems is that all actions are avail-
able at all times. In many applications, however, this assumption is not appropri-
ate. In network routing problems, for example, some of the routes are unavailable
at some point in time due to router or link crashes. Or, in electronic commerce
problems, items are out of stock, sellers are not available (due to maintenance or
simply going out of business), and buyers do not buy all the time. Even in the
setting that gave multi-armed bandit problems their name, a gambler playing slot
machines, some of the slot machines might be occupied by other players at any
given time.
In this chapter we relax the assumption that all actions are available at all times,
and allow the set of available actions to vary in an adversarial way from one round
to the next, a model known as “predictors that specialize” or “sleeping experts” in
prior work. The first foundational question that needs to be addressed is how to
define regret when the set of available actions may vary over time. Defining regret
with respect to the best action in hindsight is no longer appropriate since that
action might sometimes be unavailable. A useful thought experiment for guiding
our intuition is the following: if each action had a fixed payoff distribution that
was known to the decision-maker, what would be the best way to choose among
the available actions? The answer is obvious: one should order all of the actions
according to their expected payoff, then choose among the available actions by
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selecting the one which ranks highest in this ordering. Guided by the outcome
of this thought experiment, we define our base to be the best ordering of actions
in hindsight (see Section 4.1.1 for a formal definition) and contend that this is
a natural and intuitive way to define regret in our setting. This contention is
also supported by the informal observation that order-based decision rules seem to
resemble the way people make choices in situations with a varying set of actions,
e.g. choosing which brand of beer to buy at a store.
We prove lower and upper bounds on the regret with respect to the best order-
ing for both the best expert setting and the multi-armed bandit setting. We first
explore the case of a stochastic adversary, where the payoffs received by action i
at each time step are independent samples from an unknown but fixed distribu-
tion Pi(·) supported on [0, 1] with mean µi. (Note that in this work, the choice
of which actions are available to be picked in each round is always adversarial. In
other words, there is no distributional assumption on the subset of available ac-
tions.) Assuming that µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µn (and the algorithm, of course, does not
know the identities of these actions) we show that the regret of any learning algo-















in the multi-armed bandit setting if the game is played
for T rounds (for T sufficiently large1). We also present efficient learning algo-
rithms for both settings. For the multi-armed bandit setting, our algorithm, called
AUER, is an adaptation of the UCB1 algorithm in Auer et al. (2002a), which comes
within a constant factor of the lower bound mentioned above. For the expert set-
ting, a very simple algorithm, called “follow-the-awake-leader”, which is a variant
of “follow-the-leader” (Hannan, 1957; Kalai and Vempala, 2005), comes within a
1As is the convention in the literature, the problem instance is not allowed to depend on T in
the stochastic setting. In other words, first the problem instance is chosen, and then we look at
regret bounds as a function of T .
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constant factor of the lower bound above. While our algorithms are adaptations
of existing techniques, the proofs of the upper and lower bounds hinge on some
technical innovations.
For the lower bound in stochastic multi-armed bandit setting, we must modify
the classic asymptotic lower bound proof of Lai and Robbins (1985b) to obtain
a bound which holds at all sufficiently large finite times. For the stochastic best
expert setting, we adapt standard KL-divergence arguments to prove a precise
lower bound that also holds for sufficiently large finite times. Our lower bounds
in Lemma 4.2.8 and Lemma 4.2.14 don’t refer to the “sleeping” version of the
problem, and concern the classical best-expert setting and multi-armed bandit
setting (all actions available), which might be of interest outside the context of
this work.
To prove that our lower and upper bounds are within a constant factor of each
other we use a novel lemma (Lemma 4.2.4) that allows us to relate a regret upper
bound arising from application of UCB1 to a sum of lower bounds for two-armed
bandit problems (and similarly in the best expert setting).
Next we explore the fully adversarial case where we make no assumptions on
how the payoffs for each action are generated (in particular, they could depend on
the time horizon T ). This model has been extensively studied in both the best
expert setting and the multi-armed bandit setting (see (Littlestone and Warmuth,
1994), (Auer et al., 2002a) and references therein). For the variant in which only
a subset of the actions are available at any given time, we show that the regret of
any learning algorithm must be at least Ω(
√
Tn log(n)) for the best expert setting
and Ω(
√
Tn2) for the multi-armed bandit setting. We also present simple variants
of algorithms in (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994) and (Auer et al., 2002a) whose
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regret is within a constant factor of the lower bound for the best expert setting,
and within O(
√
log(n)) of the lower bound for the multi-armed bandit setting.
The fully adversarial case, however, proves to be harder, and neither algorithm
is computationally efficient. To appreciate the hardness of the fully adversarial
case, we prove that, unless RP = NP, any low regret algorithm that learns inter-
nally a consistent ordering over experts can not be computationally efficient (see
Theorem 4.3.3). Note that this does not mean that there can be no computation-
ally efficient, low regret algorithms for the fully adversarial case. There might exist
learning algorithms that are able to achieve low regret without actually learning a
consistent ordering over experts. Finding such algorithms, if they do indeed exist,
remains an open problem.
4.1.1 Terminology and Conventions
We assume that there is a fixed pool of actions, {1, 2, ...n}, with n known. We
will sometimes refer to an action by expert in the best expert setting and by arm
or bandit in the multi-armed bandit setting. At each time step t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T},
an adversary chooses a subset A(t) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n} of the actions to be available.
The algorithm can only choose among available actions, and only available actions
receive rewards. The reward received by an available action i at time t is ri(t) ∈
[0, 1].
As also mentioned in Chapter 1, we will consider two models for assigning
rewards to actions: a stochastic model and an adversarial model. (In contrast, the
choice of the set of awake experts is always adversarial.) In the stochastic model
the reward for arm i at time t, ri(t), is drawn independently from a fixed unknown
distribution Pi(·) with bounded support and mean µi. In the adversarial model
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we make no stochastic assumptions on how the rewards are assigned to actions.
Instead, we assume that the rewards are selected by an adaptive adversary. The
adversary is potentially but not necessarily randomized.
Let σ be an ordering (permutation) of the n actions, and A a subset of the
actions. We denote by first(A, σ) the action in A that is highest ranked in σ.
That is
first(A, σ) = min
i∈{1,2,...,n}
σ(1 : i) ∩ A 6= ∅,
where σ(1 : i) denotes the first i actions according to σ ordering.
A σ-policy corresponding to the ordering σ is the policy that selects, at each
time step t, the action first(A(t), σ) (i.e. available action that is highest ranked
by σ). The reward of a policy σ is the reward obtained by the selected action at
each time step:




Let rmax -σ(1 : T ) = maxσ rσ(1 : T ) (maxσ E[rσ(1 : T )] in the stochastic rewards
model) be the reward obtained by the best σ-policy (ordering), which is also called
the benchmark. Note that in the stochastic reward model, the expectation is
taken before taking the maximum over all orderings, which corresponds to the
“maximum expected” reward, as opposed to the “expected maximum” reward in
the adversarial setting (as is also done in the literature). We define the regret of
an algorithm with respect to the best σ-policy as the expected difference between
the reward obtained by the best σ-policy and the total reward of the algorithm’s
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chosen actions x(1), x(2), ..., x(t):
regretx(1 : T ) = E
[






where the expectation is taken over the algorithm’s random choices and the ran-
domness used in the reward assignment.
4.1.2 Related Work
Sequential prediction problems. The best-expert and multi-armed bandit
problems correspond to special cases of our model in which every action is al-
ways available. These problems have been widely studied, and we draw on this
literature to design algorithms and prove lower bounds for the generalizations con-
sidered here. The adversarial expert paradigm was introduced by Littlestone and
Warmuth (1994), and Vovk (1990). Cesa-Bianchi et al. (1997) further developed
this paradigm in work which gave optimal regret bounds of
√
T (lnn) and Vovk
(1998) characterized the achievable regret bounds in these settings.
The multi-armed bandit model was introduced by Robbins (1952). Lai and
Robbins (1985b) gave asymptotically optimal strategies for the stochastic version
of bandit problem, where rewards for each arm are drawn from a fixed distribution
in each time step.
Auer et al. (2002a) introduced the algorithm UCB1 (presented and analyzed in
Section 2.3) and showed that the optimal regret bounds of O(log T ·∑n−1i=1 1µi−µi+1 )
can be achieved uniformly over time for the stochastic bandit problem (the arms are
arranged such that µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µn). For the adversarial version of the multi-
armed bandit problem, Auer et al. (2002a) proposed the algorithm Exp3 (presented




log n factor gap from the lower bound of Ω(
√
nT ). Recently, Audibert
and Bubeck (2009) proposed a O(
√
Tn) regret algorithm for the adversarial multi-
armed bandit problem closing the sub-logarithmic gap. It is worth noting that the
lower bound holds even for an oblivious adversary, one which chooses a sequence
of payoff functions independently of the algorithm’s choices.
Prediction with sleeping experts. Freund et al. (1997) and Blum and Man-
sour (2005) have analysed the sleeping experts problem in a different framework
from the one we adopt here. In the model of Freund et al. (1997), as in our model,
a set of awake experts is specified in each time period. The goal of the algorithm
is to choose one expert in each time period so as to minimize regret against the
best “mixture” of experts (which constitutes their benchmark). A mixture u is
a probability distribution (u1, u2, . . . , un) over n experts which in time period t
selects an expert according to the restriction of u to the set of awake experts.
In contrast, our work uses a different evaluation criterion, namely the best or-
dering of experts. In the special case when all experts are always awake, both eval-
uation criteria pick the best expert. Our “best ordering” criterion can be regarded
as a degenerate case (limiting case) of the “best mixture” criterion of Freund et al.
(1997) as follows. For the ordering σ, we assign probabilities 1
Z
(1, , 2, . . . , n−1) to
the sequence of experts (σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(n)) where Z = 1−
n
1− is the normalization
factor and  > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive constant. The only problem is that
the bounds obtained from Freund et al. (1997) in this degenerate case are very
weak. As  → 0, their bound reduces to comparing the algorithm’s performance
to the ordering σ’s performance only for time periods when expert σ(1) is awake,
and ignoring the time periods when σ(1) is not awake. Therefore, a natural reduc-
tion of our problem to the problem considered by Freund et al. (1997) defeats the
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purpose of giving equal importance to all time periods.
Blum and Mansour (2005) consider a generalization of the sleeping expert prob-
lem, where one has a set of time selection functions and the algorithm aims to have
low regret with respect to every expert, according to every time selection function.
It is possible to solve our regret-minimization problem (with respect to the best
ordering of experts) by reducing to the regret-minimization problem solved by
Blum and Mansour, but this leads to an algorithm which is neither computation-
ally efficient nor information-theoretically optimal. We now sketch the details of
this reduction. One can define a time selection function for each (ordering, expert)
pair (σ, i), according to Iσ,i(t) = 1 if i σ j for all j ∈ A(t) (that is, σ chooses i










Tn2 log n+ n2 log n
)
.
This algorithm takes exponential time (due to the exponential number of time
selection functions) and gives a regret bound of O(
√
Tn2 log n) against the best
ordering, a bound which we improve in Section 4.3 using a different algorithm which
also takes exponential time but is information-theoretically optimal. (Of course,
Blum and Mansour were designing their algorithm for a different objective, not
trying to get low regret with respect to best ordering. Our improved bound for
regret with respect to the best ordering does not imply an improved bound for
experts learning with time selection functions.)
Langford and Zhang (2007) presents an algorithm called the Epoch-Greedy al-
gorithm for bandit problems with side information. This is a generalization of the
multi-armed bandit problem in which the algorithm is supplied with a piece of
side information in each time period before deciding which action to play. Given
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a hypothesis class H of functions mapping side information to actions, the Epoch-
Greedy algorithm achieves low regret against a sequence of actions generated by
applying a single function h ∈ H to map the side information in every time period
to an action. (The function h is chosen so that the resulting sequence has the
largest possible total payoff.) The stochastic case of our problem is reducible to
theirs, by treating the set of available actions, A(t), as a piece of side informa-
tion and considering the hypothesis class H consisting of functions hσ, for each
total ordering σ of the set of actions, such that hσ(A) selects the element of A
which appears first in the ordering σ. The regret bound in Langford and Zhang
(2007) is expressed implicitly in terms of the expected regret of an empirical reward
maximization estimator, which makes it difficult to compare this bound with ours.
Instead of pursuing this reduction from our problem to the contextual bandit prob-
lem in Langford and Zhang (2007), we propose a very simple bandit algorithm for
the stochastic setting with an explicit regret bound that is provably information-
theoretically optimal.
4.2 Stochastic Model of Rewards
We first explore the stochastic rewards model, where the reward for action i at
each time step is drawn independently from a fixed unknown distribution Pi(·)
with mean µi. For simplicity of presentation, throughout this section we assume
that µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µn. That is, the lower numbered actions are better than the
higher numbered actions. Let ∆i,j = µi − µj for all i < j be the increase in the
expected reward of expert i over expert j.
We present optimal (up to a constant factor) algorithms for both the best expert
and the multi-armed bandit setting. Both algorithms are natural extensions of
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algorithms for the all-awake problem to the sleeping-experts problem. The analysis
of the algorithms, however, is not a straightforward extension of the analysis for
the all-awake problem and new proof techniques are required.
4.2.1 Best Expert Setting
In this section we study the best expert setting with stochastic rewards. We provide
an algorithm and prove matching (up to a constant factor) information-theoretic
lower bounds on the regret of any algorithm.
Upper Bound (Algorithm: FTAL)
To get an upper bound on regret we adapt the “follow the leader” algorithm
(Hannan, 1957; Kalai and Vempala, 2005) to the sleeping experts setting: at each
time step the algorithm chooses the awake expert that has the highest average
payoff, where the average is taken over the time steps when the expert was awake.
If an expert is awake for the first time, then the algorithm chooses it. (If there is
more than one such expert, then the algorithm chooses one of them arbitrarily.)
The pseudocode for the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.1. The algorithm is
called Follow The Awake Leader (FTAL for short).
The performance guarantee of the algorithm FTAL is presented in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let ∆i,i+1 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Then FTAL algorithm has






with respect to the best ordering.
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1 Initialize zi = 0 and ni = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
2 FOR t = 1 to T
3 IF ∃j ∈ A(t) s.t. nj = 0
4 Play expert x(t) = j
5 ELSE






7 Observe payoff ri(t) for all i ∈ A(t).
8 zi ← zi + ri(t) for all i ∈ A(t)
9 ni ← ni + 1 for all i ∈ A(t)
Figure 4.1: Follow-the-awake-leader (FTAL) algorithm for the sleeping ex-
perts problem with a stochastic adversary.
Note that we are only considering problem instances in which different arms
have different average payoffs. Also note that as ∆i,i+1 gets close to 0, the regret
bound become vacuous. A general result will be proved in Theorem 4.2.6 which will
take care of both these restrictions, and the above theorem follows as a corollary
to Theorem 4.2.6 by setting  = 0.
The above theorem follows immediately from the following pair of lemmas. The
second of these lemmas will also be used in Section 4.2.2.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let ∆i,i+1 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Then the FTAL algorithm








with respect to the best ordering.
Proof. Let ni(t) be the number of times expert i has been awake until time t. Let
µˆi(t) be expert i’s average payoff until time t. The Azuma-Hoeffding Inequality
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(Azuma, 1967; Hoeffding, 1963) says that













Let us say that the FTAL algorithm suffers an (i, j)-anomaly of type 1 at time t
if xt = j and µˆj(t)− µj > ∆i,j/2; note that the definition does not require expert
i to be awake at time t. Define i∗(t) to be the optimal expert at time t (lowest
indexed expert in A(t)). Let us say that FTAL suffers an (i, j)-anomaly of type 2
at time t if i∗(t) = i and µi − µˆi(t) > ∆i,j/2; note again that the definition does
not require expert j to be awake at time t. Note that when FTAL picks a strategy
x(t) = j 6= i = i∗(t), it suffers an (i, j)-anomaly of type 1 or 2, or possibly both.
We will denote the event of an (i, j)-anomaly of type 1 (resp. type 2) at time t by
E (1)i,j (t) (resp. E (2)i,j (t)), and we will use M (1)i,j , resp. M (2)i,j , to denote the total number
























where line (4.2.2) is justified by observing that distinct nonzero terms in (4.2.1)
have distinct values of nj(t). The expectation of M
(2)
i,j is also bounded by 8/∆
2
i,j,
via an analogous argument.
Recall that A(t) denotes the set of awake experts at time t, x(t) ∈ A(t) denotes
the algorithm’s choice at time t, and ri(t) denotes the payoff of expert i at time t
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(which is distributed according to Pi(·)). Recall that i∗(t) ∈ A(t) is the optimal
expert at time t (i.e., the lowest-numbered element of A(t)). We are now ready to
bound the regret of the FTAL algorithm. A very crucial observation that we make
next is that when arm i∗(t) is the optimal arm in round t and arm x(t) 6= i∗(t)
is picked by the algorithm, one of the following two events must have happened:
either the observed reward of arm i∗(t) is much smaller than its actual mean µi∗(t),
or the observed reward of arm x(t) is much larger than its actual mean µx(t). The
first one corresponds to an (i∗(t), x(t))-anomaly of type 2, and the second one
corresponds to an (i∗(t), x(t))-anomaly of type 1. We split the regret according to





































































(Since the event E (1)i∗(t),j(t)




















































































(Since event E (2)i,x(t)(t) occurs




























































Adding the two bounds gives the statement of the lemma.
Before presenting the next lemma that will finish the proof of Theorem 4.2.1,
let us make the following definition which will be useful in the proof.
Definition 4.2.3. For an expert j and y ≥ 0, let iy(j) be the minimum numbered
expert i ≤ j such that ∆i,j is no more than y. That is
iy(j) := arg min{i : i ≤ j,∆i,j ≤ y}.
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For an expert i, and y ≥ 0, let jy(i) be the maximum numbered expert j ≥ i such
that ∆i,j is no more than y. That is
jy(i) := arg max{j : j ≥ i,∆i,j ≤ y}.
Now we are ready to present our next lemma.
Lemma 4.2.4. Let ∆i,i+1 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Then∑
1≤i<j≤n










Note that this lemma is very important from a technical point of view in the
proof of the regret bound for FTAL, but does not have a direct bearing on the
intuitive understanding of the algorithm.
Note that Lemma 4.2.4 combined with Lemma 4.2.2 finishes the proof of Theo-
rem 4.2.1. Instead of proving the lemma above, we will prove a slight generalization
(that will be useful in taking care of “small ∆i,i+1’s”), and the lemma above will
follow as a special case by putting  = 0.
Let us first motivate the generalization. The left hand side of the first in-





the condition ∆i,j > 0 is vacuous (we are assuming in the statement of the
lemma that ∆i,j > 0 for i < j). Instead of putting an upper bound on∑
1≤i<j≤n:∆i,j>0 ∆
−2
i,j ∆i,i+1, we will relax the condition ∆i,j > 0 to ∆i,j >  for some
 ≥ 0 and prove an upper bound on ∑1≤i<j≤n:∆i,j> ∆−2i,j ∆i,i+1. Let us present the
general case.
Lemma 4.2.5. For  ≥ 0,∑
1≤i<j≤n:∆i,j>











Recall from Definition 4.2.3 that if ∆i,j > 0 for i < j, then j0(i) = i for all i
and i0(j) = j for all j, and the above lemma reduces to Lemma 4.2.4 by taking
 = 0.
Proof. It suffices to prove the first of the two inequalities stated in the lemma; the
second follows from the first by replacing each µi with 1− µi, which has the effect
of replacing ∆i,j with ∆n+1−j,n+1−i.
























|{j :  < ∆i,j ≤ y}| y−3 dy. (4.2.7)
Now we can write the following chain of inequalities. (Note that the best






























∆i,i+1 · |{j :  < ∆i,j ≤ y}|
)













1 { < ∆i,j ≤ y}
)
dy (Expanding |{·}|










∆i,i+11 { < ∆i,j ≤ y}
)











∆i,i+11 { < ∆i,j ≤ y}
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∆i,i+11 { < ∆i,j ≤ y}
)























Now, we need a little care in manipulating this expression. Let us consider two
cases: (i) µi(j) = µi0(j), which means that there is no arm with mean in (µj, µj+],
and (ii) µi(j) > µi0(j), which means that there is some arm with mean in (µj, µj+].
In the first case, µiy(j) − µi(j) is zero whenever y < ∆i0(j)−1,i0(j), so the lower limit
of the integration can be changed to ∆i0(j)−1,i0(j). In the second case, no special
care needs to be taken. Note that in both cases, µiy(j) − µi(j) ≤ y. Also note that
for j such that µj = µ1, the difference µiy(j) − µi(j) is always zero (both terms
being equal to µ1. So, we can change the lower limit of the outer sum to start from









































This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Remarks for small ∆i,i+1 Note that the upper bound stated in Theorem 4.1
become very large when ∆i,i+1 is very small for some i. Indeed, when mean payoffs
of all experts are equal, ∆i,i+1 = 0 for all i and upper bound becomes trivial, while
the algorithm does well (picking any expert is as good as any other). We suggest
a slight modification of the proof to take care of such case.
Let  > 0 be fixed (the original theorem corresponds to the case  = 0).
Recall the definition of i(j) and j(i) from Definition 4.2.3. Note that the three
conditions: (1) i < i(j), (2) j > j(i), and (3) ∆i,j >  are equivalent. The idea in
this new analysis is to “identify” experts that have means within  of each other.
(We cannot just make equivalence classes based on this, since the relation of “being
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within  of each other” is not an equivalence relation.)






















































since only one of the events E (1)i∗(t),j(t) (corresponding to j = x(t)) can occur for
each t. Equation (4.2.5) can be similarly modified by splitting the summation
j = i+ 1 · · ·x(t) to j = i+ 1 · · · j(i) and j = j(i) + 1 · · ·x(t).
To upper bound the regret by the sum of inverses of ∆i,i+1, we can use
Lemma 4.2.5. With these modifications to the proof, we have established the
following variant of Theorem 4.2.1. Note that the result of Theorem 4.2.1 can be
seen to be a special case of the theorem below by setting  = 0.












with respect to the best ordering.
Lower Bound
In this section, assuming that the means µi are bounded away from 0 and 1, we
prove that FTAL’s regret presented in the section above is optimal (up to constant
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factors). This is done by showing the following lower bound on the regret guarantee
of any algorithm. Let Bernoulli(p) denote the Bernoulli distribution with mean p.
We use KL(p; q) to denote the KL-divergence of two distributions, and for the case
of Bernoulli distributions with means µ and µ′, we use the notation KL(µ;µ′) in-
stead of writing a somewhat more wordy notation KL(Bernoulli(µ),Bernoulli(µ′)).
Please refer to Karp and Kleinberg (2007b) and Cover and Thomas (1999) for an
introduction to KL-divergence.
Lemma 4.2.7. Let Pi = Bernoulli(µi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n be the payoff distributions
with µi ∈ (α, β) for some 0 < α < β < 1 (µi’s can be relaxed to lie in the closed
interval [α, β]). Let φ be any algorithm for the stochastic best expert model. Then,
there is an input instance with n arms endowed with some permutation of the
aforementioned distributions (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), such that the regret of φ up to time









whenever T ≥ T0, where T0 is a function of n, (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn), α, and β.
To prove this lemma, we first prove its special case for the case of two experts.
Lemma 4.2.8. Let Pi = Bernoulli(µi) for i = 1, 2 be payoff distribution with
µ1, µ2 ∈ (α, β), µ1 > µ2, and 0 < α < β < 1. Let φ be an online algorithm for
the stochastic best expert problem with two experts. Consider two instances I1 and
I2 for the stochastic best expert setting: In both instances, there are two experts
namely L and R; in I1, (L,R) are endowed with reward distributions (P1, P2) and
in I2, they are endowed with (P2, P1). Then the regret of algorithm φ on at least







whenever T ≥ T0, where δ = µ1 − µ2, T0 is a function of (µ1, µ2), α, and β, and
the constants inside the Ω(·) may depend on α, β.
Proof. Let us define some joint distributions: p is the joint distribution in which
both experts have payoff distribution P1, qL is the distribution in which they have
payoff distributions (P1, P2) (left is better), and qR is the distribution in which




for c = min{α(1−α),β(1−β)}
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, and T ≥ T0. We will prove that if φ
runs for T rounds, then for one the instances qL or qR, it will suffer at least Ω(δ
−1)
regret.
Let us define the following events: EL(t) is true if φ picks L at time t, and
similarly ER(t).
We denote by pt(·) the distribution induced by φ on the t-step histories, where
the distribution of rewards in each time period is p(·). Similarly for qt(·). We have
pt[EL(t)] + pt[ER(t)] = 1. Therefore, for every t, there exists M ∈ {L,R} such
that pt[EM(t)] ≥ 1/2. Similarly, there exists M ∈ {L,R} such that∣∣∣∣{t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T, pt[EM(t)] ≥ 12
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ T2 .
Without loss of generality, assume that M = L. Now assume the algorithm faces
the input distribution qR, and define q = qR. Using KL(·; ·) to denote the KL-
divergence of two distributions, we have
KL(pt; qt) ≤ KL(pT ; qT ) = T · KL(p; q) = cδ−2 · KL(µ1;µ2)
≤ cδ−2 · δ
2




by the choice of c.
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Karp and Kleinberg (2007b) prove the following lemma. If there is an event E
with p(E) ≥ 1/3 and q(E) < 1/3, then










We have that for at least T/2 values of t, pt(EL(t)) ≥ 1/3 (it is actually at least














This gives qt(EL(t)) ≥ 1
10














Since T = Ω(δ−2), we have that the regret is at least
1
10
δ · Ω(δ−2) = Ω(δ−1).
This finishes the proof of the lower bound for two experts. We next prove the
lower bound for n experts.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.7: Let us group experts in pairs of 2 as (2i − 1, 2i) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , bn/2c. Apply the two-expert lower bound from Lemma 4.2.8 by
creating a series of time steps when A(t) = {2i − 1, 2i} for each i. (We need a
sufficiently large time horizon — namely T ≥∑bn/2ci=1 c∆−22i−1,2i — in order to apply
the lower bound to all bn/2c two-expert instances.) The total regret suffered by
any algorithm is the sum of regret suffered in the independent bn/2c instances
defined above. Using the lower bound from Lemma 4.2.8, we get that the regret










Similarly, if we group the experts in pairs according to (2i, 2i + 1) for i =


























This proves the lemma.
4.2.2 Multi-Armed Bandit Setting
We now turn our attention to the multi-armed bandit setting against a stochastic
adversary. We first present a variant of the UCB1 algorithm (Auer et al., 2002a),
and then present a matching lower bound based on an idea from Lai and Robbins
(1985b).
Upper Bound (Algorithm: AUER)
Here the optimal algorithm is again a natural extension of the UCB1 algorithm
(Auer et al., 2002a) to the sleeping-bandits case. In a nutshell, the algorithm
keeps track of the running average of payoffs received from each arm, and also




around arm j, where t is
the current time interval and nj(t) is the number of times j’s payoff has been
observed (number of times arm j has been played). At time t, if an arm becomes
available for the first time then the algorithm chooses it. Otherwise the algorithm
optimistically picks the arm with highest “upper estimated reward” (or “upper
confidence bound” in UCB1 terminology) among the available arms. That is, it
picks the arm j ∈ A(t) with maximum µˆj(t) + ρj(t) where µˆj(t) is the mean of the
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1 Initialize zi = 0 and ni = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
2 FOR t = 1 to T
3 IF ∃j ∈ A(t) s.t. nj = 0
4 Play arm x(t) = j
5 ELSE









7 Observe payoff rx(t)(t) for arm x(t)
8 zx(t) ← zx(t) + rx(t)(t)
9 nx(t) ← nx(t) + 1
Figure 4.2: The AUER algorithm for the sleeping bandit problem with a
stochastic adversary.




is the width of the
confidence interval around arm j at time t. The algorithm is shown in Figure 4.2.
The algorithm is called Awake Upper Estimated Reward (AUER).
We first need to state a claim about the confidence intervals that we are using.





following holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ t ≤ T :
P
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Proof. The equality follows since the two events are the same. The proof of in-
equality is an application of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds, and follows from (Auer
et al., 2002a, pp. 242–243).
Theorem 4.2.10. For problem instances with ∆i,i+1 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1,
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the regret of the AUER algorithm is at most






up to time T .
The theorem follows immediately from the following lemma and Lemma 4.2.4.
Note that we are only considering problem instances in which different arms have
different means. This restriction will be removed at the end of this section, where
we present a general bound, and the above theorem will follows as a special case
of the general result.
Lemma 4.2.11. For problem instances with ∆i,i+1 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, the
AUER algorithm has a regret of at most










up to time T .
Proof. We bound the regret of the algorithm arm by arm. Let us consider an arm
2 ≤ j ≤ n. For i < j, let us count the number Ni,j of times j was played when
some arm in 1, 2, . . . , i was awake. (In these iterations, the regret accumulated is
at least ∆i,j and at most ∆1,j.) We claim that E[Ni,j] ≤ Qi,j, where Qi,j := 33 lnT∆2i,j .
We want to claim that after playing j for Qi,j number of times, we are unlikely
to make the mistake of choosing j instead of something from the set {1, 2, . . . , i};
that is, if the set of awake arms at time t includes some arm in [i] as well as arm j,
then with probability at least 1− 2
t4
, some awake arm in [i] will be chosen rather
than arm j.
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Let us bound the expected number of times j is chosen when A(t)∩ [i] 6= ∅ and












(x(t) = j) ∧ (nj(t) = s) ∧




























≥ µˆk(t) + ρk(t)
)]
. (4.2.10)
Let us define the event inside the probability expression as E1 and define E2 to
be the event that µˆk(t) ∈ [µk − ρk(t), µk + ρk(t)] for all k ∈ {j} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , i}.
(Although E1 and E2 depend on s and t, we suppress this dependence for nota-
tional convenience.) The probability of event E2 is at least 1 − (i + 1)t−4 (from
Lemma 4.2.9).
We will bound use the probability of E1 by conditioning it on the event E2. We
can write P[E1] = P[E1|E2]P[E2] + P[E1|Ec2]P[Ec2] ≤ P[E1|E2] + P[Ec2]. To bound




·∆2i,j < ∆i,j2 .
If event E2 happens, µˆj(t) + ρj(t) ≤ (µj + ρj(t)) + ρj(t) < µj + ∆i,j = µi. Also,





































µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µi.)
≤ O(nT−2) (The first term is zero, since µˆj(t) + ρj(t) < µi, see
above.)
= O(1).
Therefore, after j has been played Qi,j number of times, the expected number
of additional times that j is played when A(t) ∩ [i] 6= ∅ is bounded above by a
constant. This implies
E[Ni,j] ≤ Qi,j +O(1) ≤ 33 ln(T )
∆2i,j
+O(1).














Ni,j (∆i,j −∆i+1,j) , (4.2.11)
which follows by regrouping of terms and the convention that N0,j = 0 and ∆j,j = 0
for all j. Taking the expectation of this gives the regret bound of










This gives the statement of the lemma.
Remarks for small ∆i,i+1 As noted in the case of the expert setting, the upper
bound above becomes very weak if some ∆i,i+1 are small. In such a case, the proof
















































where the last step follows from
∑n
j=2Nj−1,j ≤ T .
Taking the expectation, and using the Lemma 4.2.5, we get the following regret
bound for AUER algorithm.












up to time T .
Lower bound
In this section, we prove that the AUER algorithm presented is information theo-
retically optimal up to constant factors when the numbers µi — the mean payoffs









for this problem. This is done by closely following the lower bound of Lai and
Robbins (1985b) for two-armed bandit problems. The difference is that Lai and
Robbins prove their lower bound only in the case when T → ∞, but we want to
get bounds that hold for finite T . Our main result is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.13. Let Pi = Bernoulli(µi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n be payoff distributions
with µi ∈ (α, β) for some 0 < α < β < 1. Let φ be an algorithm for picking among
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n arms such that for all t, the expected number of times φ plays a suboptimal
bandit up to time t is bounded above by c1t
0.1 + c2 (c1 and c2 possibly depend on
µi). Then, there is an input instance with n arms endowed with some permutation
of the aforementioned distributions (Pi)
n









for T ≥ T0, where T0 is a function of n, µi, c1, c2, α, β.
We note that the exponent 0.1 in the lemma is quite arbitrary. Indeed, any
nonzero exponent would work for the purpose of the proof.
Note that the above lower bound without the (log T ) factor follows from the
stochastic best expert lower bound in Lemma 4.2.7.
Using the fact that for µi ∈ (α, β), KL(µj;µi) = Oα,β(∆2i,j), the lower bound









which matches (up the constant factors) the upper bound in Theorem 4.2.10. Note
that the notations Oα,β(·) and Ωα,β(·) hide dependence on α and β.
We first prove the result for two arms. For this, in the following, we extend the
Lai and Robbins result so that it holds (with somewhat worse constants) for finite
T , rather than only in the limit T →∞.
Lemma 4.2.14. Let Pi = Bernoulli(µi) for i = 1, 2 with µ2 < µ1, µi ∈ (α, β) for
i = 1, 2 and 0 < α < β < 1. Let φ be any algorithm for choosing among two arms
which never picks the worse arm (for any values of µ1 and µ2 in (α, β)) more than
c1t
0.1 + c2 times up to time t (c1 and c2 possibly depend on µ1 and µ2). Then there
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exists an instance with two arms endowed with two distributions above (in some









for all T ≥ T0, and the value of T0 can be explicitly computed as a function of
µ1, µ2, c1, c2, α, β.
Proof. From the assumption that µ1 and µ2 are bounded away from 0 and 1, there
exists a Bernoulli distribution with mean λ > µ1 with
|KL(µ2;λ)− KL(µ2;µ1)| ≤ 1
10
· KL(µ2;µ1),
because of the continuity of KL divergence in its second argument. Indeed, using
the convexity of KL(µ2; ·) (for fixed µ2), and the fact that the slope of KL(µ2; ·) is
bounded by β−µ2











claim provides us with a Bernoulli distribution with mean λ (which is an explicit




From now on, until the end of the proof, we work with the following two distribu-
tions on T -step histories: p is the distribution induced by the algorithm φ playing
against Bernoulli arms with means (µ1, µ2), and q is the distribution induced by
φ playing against Bernoulli arms with means (µ1, λ). From the assumption of the
lemma, we have
Eq[T − n2(T )] ≤ c1T 0.1 + c2.
Note that c1 and c2 here are functions of µ1 and λ (which in turn is a function of

















for T > e5/(9KL(µ2;λ))
)
≤ 4c1T−0.9. (for T > (c2/c1)10)
(4.2.13)
Let E denote the event that n2(T ) < 910(log T )/KL(µ2;λ). If Pp(E) < 1/3, then
Ep[n2(T )] ≥ Pp(E) · 9
10














which implies the stated lower bound.
Henceforth, we will assume Pp(E) ≥ 1/3. We have Pq(E) < 1/3 using (4.2.13).
Now applying the lemma from Karp and Kleinberg (2007b) stated in (4.2.9), we
have




























The chain rule for KL divergence (Cover and Thomas, 1999, Theorem 2.5.3) implies
KL(p; q) = Ep[n2(T )] · KL(µ2;λ) (4.2.15)
Combining (4.2.14) with (4.2.15), we get
Ep[n2(T )] ≥


















































which can be explicitly written as a function of µ1, µ2, c1, c2, α, β.
We now extend the result from 2 to n bandits.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.13: A naive way to extend the lower bound is to divide the
time line between n/2 blocks of length 2T/n each and use n/2 separate two-armed
bandit lower bounds as done in the proof of Lemma 4.2.7.
We can pair the arms in pairs of (2i− 1, 2i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , bn/2c. We present































finishing the proof of the lemma.
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4.3 Adversarial Model of Rewards
We now turn our attention to the case where no distributional assumptions are
made on the generation of rewards. We consider in turn the best expert setting
and the multi-armed bandit setting. For each setting, we first prove information
theoretic lower bounds on the regret of any online learning algorithm, and then
present online algorithms whose regret is within a constant factor of the lower
bound for the expert setting and within a sub-logarithmic factor of the lower
bound for the bandit setting. Unlike in the stochastic rewards setting, however,
these algorithms are not computationally efficient. It is an open problem if there
exists an efficient algorithm whose regret grows as O(T 1−nc) for some positive
constants , c.
4.3.1 Best Expert Setting
In this section, we consider the adversarial sleeping best expert setting. Recall that
in the sleeping best expert setting, the algorithm chooses an expert to play in each
time round from the set of available experts, and at the end of the round, gets to
observe the rewards of all available experts for that round, not just for the one it
chose. There is no assumption on how the rewards of these experts are generated
in each round; indeed an adversary chooses the reward of each expert in each time
round, and can observe the choices made by the algorithm prior to that round
in choosing the rewards for a particular round. Additionally, the adversary also
chooses which subset of the experts will be awake (available) in each time round.
We first present a lower bound on the achievable regret of any algorithm for
the adversarial sleeping best expert problem.
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Theorem 4.3.1. For every online algorithm ALG and every time horizon T , there
is an adversary such that the algorithm’s regret with respect to the best ordering,




Proof. We construct a randomized oblivious adversary (i.e. a distribution on in-
put sequences of length T ) such that the regret of any algorithm ALG is at least
Ω(
√
Tn log(n)). The adversary partitions the timeline {1, 2, . . . , T} into a series
of two-expert games, i.e. intervals of consecutive rounds during which only two ex-
perts are awake and all the rest are asleep. In total there will be Q(n) = Θ(n log n)
two-expert games, where Q(n) is a function to be specified later in (4.3.2). For
i = 1, 2, . . . , Q(n), the set of awake experts throughout the i-th two-experts game
is a pair A(i) = {xi, yi}, determined by the adversary based on the (random)
outcomes of previous two-experts games. The precise rule for determining the
elements of A(i) will be explained later in the proof.
Each two-experts game runs for T0 = T/Q(n) rounds, and the payoff functions
for the rounds are independent, random bijections from A(i) to {0, 1}. Letting
g(i)(xi), g
(i)(yi) denote the total payoffs of xi and yi, respectively, during the two-
experts game, it follows from Khintchine’s inequality (Khintchine, 1923) that
E
(∣∣g(i)(xi)− g(i)(yi)∣∣) = Ω(√T0) . (4.3.1)
The expected payoff for any algorithm can be at most T0
2
, so for each two-experts
game the regret of any algorithm is at least Ω(
√
T0). For each two-experts game
we define the winner Wi to be the element of {xi, yi} with the higher payoff in the
two-experts game; we will adopt the convention that Wi = xi in case of a tie. The
loser Li is the element of {xi, yi} which is not the winner.
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The adversary recursively constructs a sequence of Q(n) two-experts games and
an ordering of the experts such that the winner of every two-experts game precedes
the loser in this ordering. (We call such an ordering consistent with the sequence
of games.) In describing the construction, we assume for convenience that n is
a power of 2. If n = 2 then we set Q(2) = 1 and we have a single two-experts
game and an ordering in which the winner precedes the loser. If n > 2 then we
recursively construct a sequence of games and an ordering consistent with those
games, as follows:
1. We construct Q(n/2) games among the experts in the set {1, 2, . . . , n/2} and
an ordering ≺1 consistent with those games.
2. We construct Q(n/2) games among the experts in the set {(n/2) + 1, . . . , n}
and an ordering ≺2 consistent with those games.
3. Let k = 2Q(n/2). For i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2, we define xk+i and yk+i to be the
i-th elements in the orderings ≺1,≺2, respectively. The (k+i)-th two-experts
game uses the set A(k+i) = {xk+i, yk+i}.
4. The ordering of the experts puts the winner of the game between xk+i and
yk+i before the loser, for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n/2, and it puts both elements of
A(k+i) before both elements of A(k+i+1).
By construction, it is clear that the ordering of experts is consistent with the
games, and that the number of games satisfies the recurrence
Q(n) = 2Q(n/2) + n/2, (4.3.2)
whose solution is Q(n) = Θ(n log n).
The best ordering of experts achieves a payoff at least as high as that achieved
by the constructed ordering which is consistent with the games. By (4.3.1), the
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expected payoff of that ordering is T/2 + Q(n) · Ω(√T0). The expected payoff of
ALG in each round t is 1/2, because the outcome of that round is independent of
the outcomes of all prior rounds. Hence the expected payoff of ALG is only T/2,
and its regret is
Q(n) · Ω(
√
T0) = Ω(n log n
√
T/(n log n)) = Ω(
√
Tn log n).
This proves the theorem.
It is interesting to note that the adversary that achieves this lower bound is not
adaptive in either choosing the payoffs or choosing the awake experts at each time
step, i.e. it makes these choices without considering the algorithm’s past decisions.
It only needs to be able to carefully coordinate which experts are awake based on
the payoffs at previous time steps.
Even more interesting is the fact that this lower bound is tight, so an adaptive
adversary is not more powerful than an oblivious one. There is a learning algorithm
that achieves a regret of O(
√
Tn log(n)). We turn our attention to this algorithm
now.
To achieve this regret we transform the sleeping experts problem to a problem
with n! experts that are always awake, and we choose among these n! experts
using the Hedge algorithm (see (Freund and Schapire, 1999), and Section 2.1). In
the transformed problem, we have one expert for each σ-policy (i.e. ordering of
the original n experts). At each round, each of the n! experts makes a prediction
according to its corresponding σ-policy, (i.e. the same prediction as the highest
ranked awake expert in the corresponding ordering), and receives the payoff of that
policy (i.e. the payoff of the highest ranked awake expert in the corresponding
ordering).
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Theorem 4.3.2. An algorithm that makes predictions using the Hedge algorithm
on the transformed problem achieves O(
√
Tn log(n)) regret with respect to the best
ordering.
Proof. Every expert in the transformed problem receives the payoff of its cor-
responding ordering in the original problem. Since Hedge achieves regret
O(
√
T log(n!)) with respect to the best expert in the transformed problem, the
same regret is achieved by the algorithm in the original problem. The theorem
follows by applying the bound log(n!) = O(n log n), which is a consequence of
Stirling’s formula.
In a naive implementation the algorithm described above is obviously not com-
putationally efficient since in each round we have to sample among n! experts and
update n! weights. A natural question is whether this algorithm can be imple-
mented in polynomial time by devising an efficient sampling scheme and a clever
weight update procedure. The following theorem, unfortunately, shatters any hope
that this might be possible.
Theorem 4.3.3. Unless RP = NP, any learning algorithm for the adversarial
sleeping experts problem that:
1. generates its output by sampling over σ-policies, independently of the set of
awake experts
2. has regret bounded by T 1−·p(n) for some  > 0 and some polynomial function
p(·)
cannot be implemented in polynomial time.
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Proof. We prove this theorem via a reduction from the minimum feedback arc
set problem (Garey and Johnson, 1979). The notion of reduction here is not the
usual Karp-reduction, but we will show that if there is an algorithm with specified
conditions, then we can find the optimum for any feedback arc set instance with
probability at least 1− δ for any constant δ > 0.
Let ALG be any algorithm that respects the conditions in the theorem. We
are given a directed graph G = (V,A), in which we are to find the minimum
feedback arc set. Every permutation of the vertices defines a feedback arc set,
but this mapping is not one to one. (There can be many permutations for one
feedback arc set.) For a permutation σ, the corresponding feedback arc set is the
set of arcs going from higher numbered vertices to lower numbered vertices, i.e. ,
{a = (u, v) ∈ A : σ(u) > σ(v)}. The cardinality of this set is denoted by FAS(σ).
For a feedback arc set A′ ⊆ A, a corresponding permutation can be found by
choosing one of the topological orderings of the graph (G,A \ A′). It is easy to
see that the minimum feedback arc set is equal to minσ FAS(σ). We will use the
learning algorithm ALG to find, with high probability, an ordering σ minimizing
FAS(σ).
We instantiate an adversarial sleeping experts problem with |V | experts, one
for each vertex in the graph. In each round, the adversary selects an arc (u, v)
in A uniformly at random and makes the two experts corresponding to the head
(v) and the tail (u) of the selected arc awake and all the other experts asleep. It
then associates a payoff of 1 to the expert corresponding to the tail of the arc
and a payoff of 0 to the expert corresponding to the head of the arc. We play for
T := 2(d1
δ
ep(n)m)1/ rounds and in each round we record the σ-policy selected by
ALG and also the feedback arc set value of the permutation σ. At the end of the
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1 Let σ = (1, 2, . . . , |V |) (current best permutation) and x = FAS(σ) (value of the
best feedback arc set so far).
2 FOR t = 1 to T = 2(d1
δ
ep(n)m)1/
3 Choose (u, v) ∈ A at random from m arcs in A. Let {u, v} be the set of
awake experts. Set the payoff of u to 1 and the payoff of v to 0.
4 Record the permutation σt that the algorithm ALG outputs.
5 IF x > FAS(σt)
6 σ ← σt
7 x← FAS(σt)
8 Output {a = (u, v) ∈ A : σ(u) > σ(v)} as the feedback arc set.
Figure 4.3: Algorithm to solve Feedback Arc Set Problem from low regret
adversarial expert algorithm.
T rounds we choose the best permutation among the T rounds — the one with
the smallest FAS(σ) value — and output the corresponding feedback arc set. See
Algorithm 4.3.
Let FAS∗ be the optimum value of the feedback arc set. Let σ be the permu-
tation selected by Algorithm 4.3. We claim that FAS(σ) = FAS∗ with probability
at least 1− δ. Since the number of rounds is polynomial in n and m ( and δ are
constants), this will solve feedback arc set in randomized polynomial time.
Since the expected regret of the algorithm is at most T 1−p(n), it follows from
Markov’s inequality that with probability at least 1 − δ, the regret is at most
1
δ
T 1−p(n). We will prove that in this event, our algorithm finds a σ with FAS(σ) =
FAS∗.
We prove this claim by contradiction. If not, then for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
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FAS(σt) ≥ FAS∗+1. The expected reward of choosing a permutation τ is 1− FAS(τ)m .












Hence, the total regret of the algorithm is at least T · 1
m
. We also know that the
regret is at most 1
δ






which simplifies to T ≤ (1
δ
p(n)m)1/, a contradiction since we have taken T to be
twice as much. This proves that if we run our algorithm for T := 2(d1
δ
ep(n)m)1/,
then with probability at least 1 − δ, we recover the optimum feedback arc set for
the graph. This proves the theorem.
Note that this does not mean that there does not exist an efficient, low regret
algorithm for the adversarial sleeping experts problem. One might be able to design
an efficient, low regret algorithm that either does not sample over σ-policies, or
makes the sampling dependent on the set of awake experts. For instance, there
exists a simple algorithm that achieves low regret against the particular adversary
used in the proof above: run a separate instance of the Hedge algorithm for every
pair of experts and, in each round, use the instance of Hedge corresponding to the
two experts that are awake. Since the adversary will only present the algorithm
with two awake experts at a time, this algorithm can always make a prediction,
and its regret will be bounded by O(
√
T · n2).
4.3.2 Multi-Armed Bandit Setting
Finally, we consider the adversarial sleeping multi-armed bandit setting. Recall
that in the sleeping multi-armed bandit setting, the algorithm chooses an arm to
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play in each round from the set of available arms, and at the end of the round,
gets to observe the rewards of the chosen arm (unlike best expert setting, where
the algorithm observes the reward of all potential choices). There is no assumption
on how the rewards of these arms are generated in each round. Additionally, an
adversary also chooses which subset of arms will be awake (available to be chosen
by the algorithm) in each round.
We first present a lower bound on the achievable regret of any algorithm for
the adversarial sleeping multi-armed bandit problem.
Theorem 4.3.4. For every online algorithm ALG and every time horizon T , there
is an adversary such that the algorithm’s regret with respect to the best ordering,
at time T , is Ω(n
√
T ).
Proof. To prove the lower bound we will rely on the lower bound proof for the
standard multi-armed bandit when all the bandits are awake (Auer et al., 2002a).
In the standard “all-awake” bandit setting with a time horizon of T0, any algorithm
will have at least Ω(
√
T0n) regret with respect to the best bandit. To ensure this
regret, the input sequence is generated by sampling T0 times independently from
a distribution in which every bandit but one receives a payoff of 1 with probability
1
2
and 0 otherwise. The remaining bandit, which is chosen at random, incurs a
payoff of 1 with probability 1
2
+  for an appropriate choice of .
To obtain the lower bound for the sleeping bandits setting we set up a sequence
of n multi-armed bandit games as described above. Each game will run for T0 =
T
n
rounds. The bandit that received the highest payoff during the game will become
asleep and unavailable in the rest of the games.








respect to the best bandit in that game. Consequently, the regret of any learning
algorithm with respect to the best ordering is bounded below by a positive constant

































Let us now turn our attention to getting an algorithm for the adversarial sleep-
ing multi-armed bandit problem. To get an upper bound on regret, we will use the
Exp4 algorithm (see Section 2.4.1, and (Auer et al., 2002a)).
Exp4 chooses an arm by combining the advice of a set of “experts”. At each
round, each expert provides advice in the form of a probability distribution over
arms. In particular the advice can be a point distribution concentrated on a single
action. (It is required that at least one of the experts is the uniform expert whose
advice is always the uniform distribution over arms.)
To use Exp4 for the sleeping experts setting, we concoct n! + 1 “experts”, one
corresponding to the “uniform” expert which chooses each arm with equal proba-
bility, and one each for n! orderings. The expert corresponding to an ordering σ
always “advises” to play the arm first(A(t), σ) (first available arm in its order-
ing), i.e., in each round, the advice of expert σ is a point distribution concentrated
on the highest ranked arm in the corresponding ordering σ.
This introduces a slight problem. Since the uniform expert may advise us to
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pick arms which are not awake, we assume for convenience that the algorithms is
not restricted to choose an action from A(t) (awake set), but is allowed to choose
any action at all, with the proviso that the payoff of an action in the complement
of A(t) is defined to be 0. Note that any algorithm for this modified problem
can easily be transformed into an algorithm for the original problem: every time
the algorithm chooses an action in the complement of A(t) we instead play an
arbitrary action in A(t) (and don’t use the feedback obtained about its payoff).
Such a transformation can only increase the algorithm’s payoff, i.e. decrease the
regret. Hence, to prove the regret bound asserted in Theorem 4.3.5 below, it
suffices to prove the same regret bound for the case when algorithm is allowed to
choose an arm in complement of A(t) with zero payoff.
Theorem 4.3.5. The Exp4 algorithm as described above achieves a regret of
O(n
√
T log(n)) with respect to the best ordering, against an adaptive adversary.
Proof. We have n arms and 1+n! experts, so the regret of Exp4 with respect to the
payoff of the best expert isO(
√
Tn log(n! + 1)) (Auer et al., 2002a). Using the esti-
mate log(n!+1) = O(n log n), this regret bound can be rewritten as O(n√T log n).
Since the payoff of each expert is exactly the payoff of its corresponding ordering,
we obtain the statement of the theorem.
The upper bound and lower bound differ by a factor of O(
√
log(n)), the
gap resulting from adapting the Exp4 algorithm to our setting. In the classi-
cal multi-armed bandit setting, Audibert and Bubeck (2009) closed a similar gap
(O(√Tn log n) upper bound versus Ω(
√
Tn) lower bound) by improving the Exp3
algorithm. It is not clear how the policies from Audibert and Bubeck (2009) can
be adapted for Exp4 algorithm, so closing the O(√log n) gap in the sleeping multi-




The potential of applying online learning framework in variety of diverse scenarios
combined with some crucial features of applications missing from the framework
lead us to work on extending it in two interesting directions.
In Chapter 3, we considered an extension which allows for arms to be strategic
agents who are trying to maximize their own utility. We are able to rigorously
prove a performance separation (in terms of regret) between algorithms for the
multi-armed bandit problem and truthful mechanisms for the multi-armed bandit
mechanism design problem (which can be viewed as a strategic analogue of multi-
armed bandit problem) with respect to implementation in dominant strategies (it
is dominant strategy for agents to tell the truth, irrespective of clicks and other
agents’ bids). This leads to natural questions about how far we can push this
separation, in terms of relaxing the notion of truthfulness from dominant strate-
gies to something weaker. Are there solution concepts in which this performance
separation is reduced (or disappears completely)? Can we prove structural results
for these solution concepts?
Weakly truthful randomized mechanism A randomized mechanism (A,P)
is called weakly truthful if for every realization of the clicks, the expected utility of
agent i by bidding the true value is at least as much as expected utility by bidding
anything else (the expectation is taken over algorithm’s random seed).
It remains an open question to formulate and prove results about the structure
of weakly truthful mechanisms, and if these mechanisms suffer more regret than
best multi-armed bandit algorithms.
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Truthfulness in expectation A mechanism (A,P) is said to be truthful in
expectation if the expected utility of agent i by bidding her true value is at least
as much as expected utility from bidding anything else (the expectation is now
taken over random seed of the algorithm and clicks). In (Babaioff et al., 2010),
it is proved that any “monotone” algorithm for the multi-armed bandit problem
can be turned into a randomized mechanism for the truthful multi-armed bandit
problem that is truthful-in-expectation and that is not normalized. Therefore,
non-normalized, truthful-in-expectation mechanisms can achieve as good regret as
achieved by best multi-armed bandit algorithms.
It is an interesting open question if normalized and truthful-in-expectation mech-
anism can perform as well as best multi-armed bandit algorithms. Note that mech-
anism derived in Section 3.8.4 is not normalized.
In Chapter 4, we have analyzed algorithms for full-information and partial-
information prediction problems in the “sleeping experts” setting, using a novel
benchmark which compares the algorithm’s payoff against the best payoff obtain-
able by selecting available actions using a fixed total ordering of the actions. We
have presented algorithms whose regret is (almost) information-theoretically opti-
mal in both the stochastic and adversarial cases.
Computationally efficient algorithms In the stochastic case, our algorithms
for sleeping expert and bandit problems are simple and computationally efficient.
In the adversarial case, the most important open question is whether there is
a computationally efficient algorithm which matches (or nearly matches) the re-
gret bounds achieved by the exponential-time algorithms presented here. Or even
before that, are their computationally efficient algorithms that achieve sublinear
regret (not necessarily information-theoretically optimal)? The result in Theo-
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rem 4.3.3 points to some difficulty in finding such algorithm, but still leaves open
the possibility of an efficient algorithm.
Closing the logarithmic gap In the adversarial multi-armed bandit setting,
we saw that the best algorithm we can find has regret bounded by O(
√
Tn2 log n),
while the lower bound places a bound of Ω(
√
Tn2) on the regret, leaving an
O(√log n) gap. A similar gap in the all-awake multi-armed bandit setting was
recently bridged by Audibert and Bubeck (2009). It is an interesting open ques-
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